

Tracing Settler Colonialism: A Genealogy of a Paradigm in the Sociology of Knowledge Production in Israel

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Abstract

Knowledge is inextricably bound to power in the context of settler colonialism where apprehension of the Other is a tool of domination. Tracing the development of the “settler colonial” paradigm, this article deconstructs Zionist and Israeli dispossession of Palestinian land and sovereignty, applying the sociology of knowledge production to the study of the Israeli-Palestinian case. The settler colonial paradigm, linked to Israeli critical sociology, post-Zionism, and postcolonialism, reemerged following changes in the political landscape from the mid-1990s that reframed the history of the Nakba as enduring, challenged the Jewish definition of the state, and legitimated Palestinians as agents of history. Palestinian scholars in Israel lead the paradigm’s reformulation. This article offers a phenomenology of Palestinian positionality, a critical potential for decolonizing the settler colonial structure and exclusive Jewish sovereignty, to consolidate a field of study that shapes not only research into the Israeli-Palestinian case but approaches to decolonization and liberation.

Keywords

settler colonialism, sociology of knowledge, Israel/Palestine, indigenous, decolonization, Palestinians in Israel

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The settler colonial paradigm, which first took shape in the 1960s alongside attendant processes of decolonization in the Middle East and Africa, has previously been applied to the context of the Zionist colonization of Palestine. A series of scholars—among them Said, Sayegh, Rodinson, Jabbour, Abu-Lughod and Abu-Laban, Hilal, El-Messiri, and Sayigh—have all employed the framework of settler colonialism to define the reality that had emerged in Palestine.¹ But the term did not take hold in the Israeli academy until later.² Despite—or perhaps because of—the ongoing nature of the settler colonial project in Palestine, settler colonial studies as a field was notably absent from the bulk of research on Palestine/Israel for around four decades.³ In the last two decades, however, we have witnessed a renewed focus on Palestine/Israel from a range of settler colonial theorists,⁴ whose works contributed to a shift in a field that also bears the mark of the renewed struggles of indigenous peoples around the world. This article examines the resurgence of the settler colonial paradigm in the case of Palestine/Israel. It points out the distinct relevance of the paradigm for analyses of the Zionist project and examines the evolution of the analytic within the Israeli academy, focusing on the two major disciplines that have produced robust criticisms of the Zionist movement and its official version of the events of 1948: sociology and history.⁵

I trace the genealogy of this knowledge production while intertwining three main arguments.⁶ First, I contend that the reemergence of the settler colonial paradigm in the social sciences and humanities in Israel can be ascribed in large part to political processes within Palestinian society in Israel in the mid-1990s, specifically, a shift in political discourse from one that promotes a two-state solution to one that envisages a state for all citizens. This shift challenges the Jewish character of the Israeli state, calling for a transformation of the state to one based on inclusion and equal rights for all, regardless of ethnic or religious differences, and includes public calls for the right of return for Palestinian refugees, invoking the history of the “Nakba” (“catastrophe” in Arabic). Second, I link this paradigm shift to a transformation in knowledge production. Whereas critical sociology, post-Zionism/the new historians, and postcolonial theory focused mainly on the events of 1948 or on critiques of Ashkenazi hegemony, the settler colonial paradigm was articulated mainly by Palestinian scholars who are citizens of Israel and by Palestinian research centers in Israel. Third, while critical and postcolonial researchers typically framed the colonial situation in Israel as historical rather than as an ongoing process continuing into the present, focusing mainly on the Zionist movement and on Israelis and their practices, the new phase of research is characterized by the return of Palestinians to history, not only as victims but also as agents of this history—as individuals, including scholars, who resisted and continue to resist the ongoing Zionist project and who, in the process, have altered its contours. This new phase is articulated by the work of a global Palestinian exchange of scholarly knowledge.⁷

It is, perhaps, inconceivable to formulate a sociology of knowledge that transcends the framework of the nation-state, which is located in a field replete with refugees and diaspora, underground organizations, and a civil society under various forms of occupation existing side by side with established institutions of settler colonial society.

Explicating the sociology of knowledge without a unified field (in Bordieuan terms), along with tracking the hegemony in a field so scattered and polarized, is but a great challenge I strive to begin here. Ultimately, I point to the well-rehearsed claim that theorizing is itself a political practice (not separate from it) in the subaltern case. The settler colonial paradigm highlights the ways in which both hegemonic knowledge and colonial structures are organized to occlude alternative possibilities. Through my genealogy, I point to a prerequisite for a just future: the decolonization of the apparatus of supremacy and settler privileges, including reframing the analysis of Jewish-Israeli privileges, reflected in theorizations and representations of Palestine and Palestinians, and dismantling persistent reproduction of epistemological violence in knowledge production. While the turn to the settler colonial paradigm I trace is not the only step required to dismantle our current colonial infrastructure (one designed and ordered around exclusion and domination), it offers a lens grounded in the enduring past and oriented toward a contingent future.

The Settler Colonial Paradigm in the Israeli-Palestinian Context

The settler colonial paradigm is not an orderly or monolithic theory. Rather, it is an interpretative framework of cumulative historical analogies, one that enables the examination of a series of societies that have been shaped as settler societies from the early modern period until today. These include but are not limited to the United States, Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and Algeria. While specific settler colonial practices differ from society to society and in different historical constellations, the outcomes of the settler colonial processes are commensurable because of their similarities, especially given the focus on land expropriation as the central dynamic.

The “reemergence” of this paradigm does not amount to a simple return to original usage. The frameworks that address colonialism and related varieties of colonial studies have a long history, but the reemergence in question here is that of, specifically, settler colonial studies, a framework crafted to explore the inner logics of multiple cases of settler colonialism (e.g., New Zealand, the United States, Canada, and Australia). Thus the reemergence of settler colonialism does not imply a simple homology between this paradigm and the previous incarnations. Whatever the differences between earlier and current versions, all applications of the paradigm share, as a common denominator, the attempt to compensate for (but not to replace) the often overly broad use of the undifferentiated term “colonialism,” with its connotations of plantation and other exploitative labor economies, by emphasizing the discrete characteristics of the processes of colonization, predicated on not only relations of settler domination but also the dispossession and replacement of indigenous peoples by a colonizing population.⁸

In the processes of settler colonization, settlers, typically backed by a metropolitan country, appropriate space inhabited by an indigenous people. The demographic balance between the settler population and the indigenous population gradually favors the former as a result of methods of dispossession, expulsion, or extermination. Whereas

colonial studies focus first and foremost on the relationship between the metropole and the colonial periphery, the settler colonial paradigm focuses on processes of transformation within settler colonial societies. The latter focus is on the dynamics of settler relations with the local inhabitants, on processes of creating settler colonial states, and the institutionalization of settlers' privileges vis-à-vis the "native" in the settler colony⁹—all characteristics that imperial and national historiographies often fail to identify or analyze.¹⁰

In contrast to administrative colonialism or franchise colonialism, which entailed the political or economic subjugation of indigenous populations, settler colonialism involves the permanent appropriation of land and other essential resources by the settler group.¹¹ One of the central pillars of settler colonialism, according to Patrick Wolfe, is the "logic of elimination," which aims to replace the natives and to appropriate their land. Although labor exploitation is often part of the process of settler colonial projects, the central goal is permanent settlement. As Wolfe articulates it, "Settler colonizers come to stay: invasion is a structure not an event."¹²

At its inception, the Zionist movement used the terminology of colonization, and permanent settlement was a core goal of the movement's founders. A salient example of this terminology can be found in the writings of Theodore Herzl, the father of political Zionism, who in 1902 demanded that Cecil Rhodes, the empire builder of British South Africa, support Zionist settlement in Palestine:

You are being invited to help make history. That cannot frighten you, nor will you laugh at it. It is not in your accustomed line; it doesn't involve Africa, but a piece of Asia Minor, not Englishmen but Jews. But had this been on your path, you would have done it by now. How, then, do I happen to turn to you, since this is an out-of-the-way matter for you? How indeed? Because it is something colonial.¹³

The colonial component can be further discerned in the names the Zionist movement gave to its institutions. Its first bank was called the Colonial Trust Company, its department of settlement the Department of Colonization.¹⁴ According to Fayeze Sayegh—the first to use the concept of settler colonialism in 1965 and the first to frame the conflict in Palestine as a settler colonial one—in the 1970s the movement turned to use the terminology of national liberation.¹⁵ But altering the national framework does not negate the colonial component of Zionism; rather, as Sayegh argues, "colonization would be the instrument of nation-building, not the by-product of an already-fulfilled nationalism."¹⁶

Over the next few decades, popular and academic Zionist thought offered two main arguments against conceptualizing Zionism within a settler colonial framework: first, that the Zionist movement did not intend to exploit local labor and thus was not a colonial movement; and second, that Zionism had no metropolitan base.¹⁷ In this regard, it is important to emphasize that it is the appropriation of key resources and the displacement of the local population—rather than its exploitation—that define settler colonial societies, whether they have a metropolitan center or not. Researchers who applied the settler colonial paradigm to the Zionist case identified two functional

alternatives to a metropolitan center: the Zionist movement outside Israel, including associated economic institutions and private donors, and the contemporary empires (British, French, American) as political sponsors of the project.¹⁸

The settler colonial paradigm generates concepts and analytical tools that can enrich our understanding of the Israeli-Palestinian case. The Zionist project involved the movement of a group of settlers from Europe to a space already populated by natives, the appropriation of the natives' lands, and the marginalization of the natives themselves. In its early stages, the project was based on the acquisition of land, a process that was accelerated by the conquest of Palestine by the British Empire in 1917 and the imposition of new legal arrangements. This violent process encountered Palestinian resistance; the settlers were repeatedly compelled to use force to expel the Palestinians from the land, either with the assistance of the British authorities or on their own.¹⁹ The Zionist project was shaped by the nature of the Palestinian resistance; the project and the resistance evolved with dialectical intensities.²⁰ However, since the process of acquiring land under the terms enforced by the British Mandate required that compensation should be given to the natives who lived on the land and that their consent to their evacuation should be obtained through purchase, the takeover was gradual. Nevertheless, around seventy Palestinian villages disappeared before 1948 as a result of the Zionist colonial process.²¹

By 1948 the Zionist movement had managed to acquire just 7 percent of the territory of Mandatory Palestine.²² But the 1948 war provided the opportunity for the establishment of Jewish sovereignty over a large part of the territory and the expulsion of the Palestinian population from it. Warfare, expulsion, and the use of state sovereignty to transform the legal regime and to enact land expropriation laws completed what the previous acquisition practices had begun.

After the establishment of the State of Israel, military rule was imposed on the Palestinian population until 1966. Its operation was put in service of the goals of the settler colonial project, ensuring Zionist control over most of the land and preventing the return of internally displaced refugees to their villages and cities, as well as the return of refugees to their homeland. At the same time, the indigenous Palestinians who remained within the State of Israel were granted citizenship and limited political rights, creating a pattern of settler colonial citizenship, largely defined during the period of military government.²³ Thus, even though it granted citizenship, the state did not recognize the natives as an indigenous national collective but rather viewed their existence on the land and in their own homeland as an obstacle to the realization of the goals of the Zionist project.²⁴ During the 1960s, the Zionist project witnessed a state of relative stability, at least in comparison to the period that preceded the inception of the Israeli state—even though within the state's "borders" several areas "remained" wherein Zionist settlement and the expulsion of the Palestinians from the land were incomplete.

The occupation of the West Bank, the Gaza Strip, and East Jerusalem in 1967 accelerated and transformed the settler colonial process through the occupation of new territories, a further round of expulsion of the indigenous population, the prevention of their return, and the settlement of Israelis (who were henceforth called *mitnakhlim*,

“colonial settlers”) in the 1967 Occupied Palestinian Territories. This time, the process was conducted under the auspices of the State of Israel, which became akin to a “mother state” promoting colonial settlement in its newly acquired territories.²⁵ Unlike the territories occupied in 1948, which received international recognition under the 1947 UN Partition Plan (even though during the war Israel seized additional territories that had not been allotted to it in the Partition Plan, including a large section of the Galilee), the territories occupied by Israel in 1967 were each classified as an “Occupied Palestinian Territory,” the official name under international law.²⁶

As the foregoing overview clearly demonstrates, the settler colonial paradigm challenges the conventional perception of relations between Israelis and Palestinians as merely a conflict between two colliding national movements; it offers a long-term and comparative historical perspective that transcends the focus on the constitutive events of 1948 or 1967. According to the settler colonial paradigm, the “Yishuv,” the new Jewish settlement that dates back to the late nineteenth century, is the “colony.” Thus the settler colonial paradigm does not negate the national component of the conflict but rather seeks to explore the ways in which it is interwoven with diverse settler colonial processes. At the same time, this national component represents the other distinctive feature of the Palestine/Israel case vis-à-vis most other instances of settler colonialism.

The Israeli case provokes additional questions about the interactions between analytical categories. In addition to investigating the various forms of control exercised by the Zionist project over different Palestinian groups, scholars working with the settler colonial paradigm in this context must analyze the composition of the settler colonial society itself and consider its internal fissures. Here, the contribution of the theme of “internal colonialism” becomes even more evident, since it reminds us that not only have colonial forms of control been applied externally but that the state’s racialized apparatus has also been applied, internally, to various ethnic groups, especially the *Mizrahim*, Jewish immigrant-settlers who came from Arab or Muslim countries who have faced persistent discrimination.²⁷ Instead of seeing themselves as agents or participants in a settler colonial project, Mizrahim generally perceive themselves rather as second-class citizens and victims of the Israeli state—an example of the kind of ethnic/racial/class discrimination that persists in many nonsettler colonial societies, further complicating the settler-native hierarchy in Israel.

In 1979, Elia Zureik introduced his pioneering work on the paradigm of internal colonialism in his book that analyzed Israeli policies toward the Palestinians in Israel.²⁸ Zureik offered “internal colonialism” as a new way of interpreting the relationship between a settler state and the Palestinian minority within it, with a critical examination of the axioms of state practices against its own citizens. Although Zureik’s work was widely received into sociology in Israel and frequently used and taught, this early work seemed to view internal colonialism as distinct from settler colonialism. While he used the binary of indigenous and settler, his analysis closely followed a Marxist class critique of inequality without delving into the systematic apparatus of replacement that shapes the settler colonial project. He highlighted the newly established domestic borders in their formation as an indigenous national group and marginalized

the interconnection of Palestinians in Israel with other Palestinians, both those living under the 1967 occupation and refugees. Seemingly, his work did not destabilize official conceptions of Israeli state sovereignty, but it was crucial in setting the scene for scholars in Israel to produce critical scholarship on the subordination of Palestinians. And it is worth mentioning that Zureik has recently articulated the settler colonial paradigm more pointedly.²⁹

While Israeli academia tended to emphasize Zureik's discussion of internal inequality vis-à-vis the Palestinians, several concurrent prominent theories of settler colonialism were largely occluded in Israel. As early as the 1960s and 1970s, Palestinian scholars began using the term "settler colonialism" to analyze the conflict.³⁰ In the 1960s, the paradigm was discussed in different intellectual milieus, including by prominent critical Middle East researchers such as Maxime Rodinson and among left-wing non-Zionist circles in Israel.³¹ Although these debates were largely absent from Israeli academic discourses for many years, since the early 2000s some researchers from the West have attempted to compare the settler colonialisms of North America (the United States and Canada), Australia, and Rhodesia with the Israeli-Palestinian case.³² However, in the following discussion, I focus on the works of Israeli and Palestinian scholars, asking what their research can teach us about the sociology of knowledge production in Israel and about new directions within the framework of the settler colonial paradigm.

Zionism, Colonialism, and Settler Colonialism in Research by Jewish Israelis

Prior to the establishment of the State of Israel and for the first four decades thereafter, the humanities and social sciences in Israel were recruited to consolidate the Zionist project. It is no wonder, then, that discussions of the colonial character of Zionism that took place among non-Zionist leftist circles were largely absent from academia. Sociology perceived itself as part of the Israeli establishment, contributing to state building and nation formation.³³ It was closely tied to the colonizing project and to the exercise of control over the indigenous people and resources.³⁴ From a Zionist perspective, Israel was an emancipatory project aimed at the salvation of the Jews who had survived the horrors of the Holocaust and antisemitism in their former European countries of residence. The Nakba of 1948 was represented both as a "war of independence" from the British Mandate and a defensive war of the Yishuv in Palestine against aggression waged by the surrounding Arab countries. The pre-1948 foundational settler colonial practices and the related violence of the Zionist project were depicted either as peaceful settlements achieved through land purchases or as peaceful attempts to coexist with the local Arab population in the promised Jewish homeland.³⁵ After 1948, with the expulsion of much of the indigenous population, the Palestinians who remained in their homeland became "Israeli Arabs" or "the Arab minority in Israel." The first designation went hand in hand with Israeli attempts to erase the name "Palestine" from the map, meant to disconnect the Palestinians who remained on what became known as Israel from Palestinian populations elsewhere.

Only in the late 1980s and beginning of the 1990s did Israeli scholars—most of whom had not personally participated in the events of 1948—begin to challenge Israel's hegemonic political myths.³⁶ The important work of such scholars, dubbed the post-Zionists or the “new historians,” played a critical role in debunking some of the state's foundational myths among Israelis and scholars in the “West.” However, such studies, and the debates that they aroused, generally remained embedded within the confines of Zionist hegemony (perhaps with the exception of the later works of Ilan Pappé).³⁷ Despite a tendency to reify (or “freeze”) the events of 1948 as an exception, the post-Zionists/new historians embarked on a process of self-examination, learning about their own history; yet they generally managed to reject foundational myths without diverging from the course of an exclusivist Jewish state. Furthermore, most did not question the settler colonial origins of the Israeli state or Israeli society. Again, the widely adopted analytical framework viewed the State of Israel as the progeny of a conflict between two national movements competing for the same piece of land, assuming a symmetry between “both sides” of the conflict.

This perspective also treats 1948 and 1967 as separate events, sustaining an epistemological division between the 1948 war and the 1967 occupation, ignoring the way both were shaped by a core structure of invasion. This act of scholarly bifurcation allowed the settler colonial character of the State of Israel to be obscured or forgotten. The processes through which the indigenous population was replaced by a settler colonial society, including the subjection of the natives who remained within Israel's borders, were normalized. Yehouda Shenhav claimed that this bifurcation was produced by the Israeli left, who, by employing the 1967 paradigm and the two-state solution, contributed to an erasure of the question of 1948 and of the ethnic cleansing committed by the Israeli military forces.³⁸ Opposing this conceptualization, Pappé and Gadi Algazi linked the 1948 and 1967 occupations, treating them as two moments of a single process.³⁹ Pappé showed that by moving control from the areas occupied in 1948 to the areas controlled in 1967, the state accomplished two major components of the Zionist project: controlling more land and decreasing the number of Palestinians living on it. Algazi described the refugee questions of 1948 and 1967 as a single continuum and argued that the 1967 expulsion complemented, to a large extent, the 1948 expulsion, which, from the perspective of Zionist leaders, had not been completed.

In recent years, several Israeli researchers have deployed the settler colonial paradigm against the backdrop of the decline of the Zionist left and the expansion of the colonial project.⁴⁰ Within the Green Line, that expansion has included the enactment of new colonial-style laws and the denial of full political rights to Palestinian citizens in Israel, plus the establishment of new settlements for Israeli Jews through the forced uprooting of Palestinian Bedouins in the Naqab (Negev). Beyond the Green Line, it entails the continuing aggressive expansion of Jewish settlements, coupled with the continuation of neocolonialist and neoliberal policies of the state and its political elites, resulting in the strengthening of control of over 80 percent of historic Palestine.⁴¹

However, such critical studies remain exceptional. To understand how and why, we must go back and briefly examine shifts within the Israeli academy, specifically in sociology, and more generally in critical theory (including postcolonial theory). As we

shall see, most seemingly critical trends have failed to grasp the full extent of the settler colonial project of Zionism.

Critical Sociology

Critical sociology in Israel has developed two major criticisms of institutional sociology,⁴² one pertaining to the ethnic and class-based characteristics of Jewish society in Israel and the other linked to the exclusion of Palestinians from an analysis of society in Israel. As a result, questions about Zionism's colonial characteristics have generally been marginalized. However, one can distinguish a small group of researchers who constituted what might be called the "first wave" of the settler colonial framework—although, to be sure, the current wave does not employ an identical framework.

Alongside the pioneering work of Avishai Ehrlich, who examined the colonial character of the Zionist project in the light of the economic interaction between Zionism and empires, Baruch Kimmerling was the most prominent Israeli scholar to compare Israel to other settler colonial cases and develop an analysis of Israel as a settler colonial society.⁴³ While Kimmerling avoided the use of the term "colonialism," the center of gravity in his work lay in the question of settlement, drawing on the concept of the "frontier," coined by Frederick Jackson Turner in the US context. Addressing "frontierity" as both a measure of "free land" available for settlement and as a key component for understanding a settler-immigrant society, Kimmerling argued that the differences between the two societies (individualist in the American case and collectivist in the Israeli case) resulted from "high frontierity" in the first case and "low frontierity" in the second. Despite the significance and usefulness of this distinction, Kimmerling's discussion of frontierity failed to address the violent processes of elimination experienced by both indigenous populations. He took for granted the term "free land"—that is, land that became "free" in North America only after the majority of the indigenous peoples were exterminated, expelled by force, or relocated, and only after the displacement of peasants through aggressive land purchase in Palestine and the expulsion of most of the Palestinian population during the Nakba. Despite his important empirical work in this area, Kimmerling did not employ the term *hitnahlut* (Israeli colonies or settlements), which has a negative connotation, using instead the term *hityashvot* (settlement), which has a positive connotation. Moreover, in focusing his attention on settler society, Kimmerling neglected the implications of Israeli settler colonialism for Palestinian society, from the dispossession of the land at the individual level to the loss of the homeland at the collective level. Later, Kimmerling dealt with the Palestinians in a book written with Joel S. Migdal; however, in that work, too, the colonial aspect was relegated to the past.⁴⁴

Gershon Shafir was among the first to produce painstaking empirical and theoretical work that examines the process of Zionist colonization in Palestine employing the framework of settler colonialism.⁴⁵ Shafir provides an illuminating account of inter-Zionist conflict between Jewish settler workers and capital owners and of the influence of this conflict in shaping the colonial project. His groundbreaking analysis of the

tension between different interests within the colonial group offers an explanation for the choice made in favor of cooperative settlement over capitalist settlement. However, Palestinians, who challenged the Zionist project through their resistance to colonization and land acquisition prior to 1948, and who suffered a consequential and continuing expulsion, remain external to his analysis.⁴⁶

Unlike Kimmerling and Shafir, Uri Ram did not conduct empirical research into the workings of the settler colonial project.⁴⁷ Rather, as a sociologist of knowledge, he uncovers the settler colonial roots of Israeli society, disclosing sociology's connections to the Israeli establishment and to the Zionist goals of the establishment. He critically surveys the work of sociologists within the framework of different paradigms, without overlooking the contribution of Palestinians and other Arab scholars to the development of those paradigms. Around the same time, Daiva Stasiulis and Nira Yuval-Davis published a comparative volume on settler colonialism that included the Israeli-Palestinian case (in a chapter coauthored by Yuval-Davis and Nahla Abdo).⁴⁸ Notably, although sociology in Israel and its social sciences in general have thoroughly absorbed Yuval-Davis's other work on gender, citizenship, and nationalism, her work on settler colonialism did not grab the same attention. This failure, too, I would argue, is part of a general pattern within "Israeli sociology," overlooking work that focuses on the settler colonial origins of the Israeli state and society.

The first phase of the application of the settler colonial paradigm to the local context focused on colonization practices and the settler society, mainly before 1948. The following period was not addressed with equivalent analytical tools, despite the continuing process of colonization of the territory before and after the 1967 war—a process termed "Judaization" within the Green Line and *hitnahlut* ("settlement") beyond the Green Line. Although their work broke new ground and led to new directions for research, critical sociologists often adopted Zionist terminology—*Aliya* instead of "immigration," and "Yishuv" instead of "colony"—while avoiding such terminology as "settler colonial nation building." Similarly, critical feminist scholars often analyzed the patriarchal national discourse while neglecting the roots of colonialism and its present-day incarnation.⁴⁹ Meanwhile, the works of Palestinian or Arab researchers usually were ignored, given a lack of knowledge of the Arabic language and scant connections to the scholarship of the Arab world.⁵⁰

In the early 1990s, an academic debate on the structure of Israel as a Jewish and democratic state was dominated by political and legal scholars, including Ruth Gavison, Asad Ghanem, Nadim Rouhana (a social psychologist), Oren Yiftachel (a geographer), and Amal Jamal.⁵¹ Other notable participants included the sociologist Sammy Smooha, whose term "ethnic democracy" reflected his claim that the regime in Israel combined ethnic dominance with democratic and political rights to its citizenry.⁵² Yiftachel coined the term "ethnocracy" to highlight the fact that the political regime in Israel is defined by Jewish ethnicity; Ghanem, Rouhana, and Yiftachel argued that the state could not be both democratic and Jewish, since its Jewish character required it to privilege Jews over members of other ethnic groups.⁵³ Amnon Raz-Krakotzkin, one of the most prominent Jewish historians to contribute to a binational discourse in the Israeli-Palestinian context, sharply criticized the definition of the

State of Israel as a Jewish and democratic state, arguing that this formulation necessarily serves the rights of the Jews while disregarding those of Palestinians. Moreover, he called the academic discussion of the definition of “Jewish and democratic” within the 1967 borders hollow, arguing that it ignored or minimized the occupation.⁵⁴ At the time, Palestinian researchers in Israel had yet to adopt the settler colonial framework because of political and social circumstances (including exclusion and repression) that I detail later.

Until recently, most Israeli academics engaged in discussing the nature of the state ignored its settler colonial components (Yiftachel’s significant work is a notable exception). Their argument that the Jewish people, like other peoples, are entitled to a nation-state of their own has ignored the granting of preferential status to Jews, even those who do not live in Israel, and the simultaneous denial of the collective rights of Palestinian citizens of Israel and of the refugees who were expelled from Palestine. The academic discussion of the nature of the regime in Israel did not develop into a public debate until the National Democratic Assembly (*Tajammu’*) political party, established in 1996, demanded that Israel should be a state of all its citizens. In 1993, one of the party’s founders, the political philosopher Azmi Bishara, published a watershed article, “On the Question of the Palestinian Minority in Israel,” that launched a historical debate among Israeli and Palestinian scholars focusing on 1948—albeit not yet within a settler colonial framework.⁵⁵ This article was given serious attention in Israeli critical academia, whereas a later piece (published in 1997 in Arabic and 1999 in Hebrew) theorizing the Zionist project as colonial in addition to national, and arguing that Zionist myth was incommensurate with the colonial reality, had a very different reception, perhaps due to the general disavowal of the colonial framework among Israeli scholars.⁵⁶ The second article theorized not simply the relation of the Palestinian minority to the state but the Zionist movement as a settler colonial one that generated a settler colonial state.

It is important to note that within the power matrix of indigenous/settler in Israel, as in most settler colonial societies, the colonizer has been the producer of knowledge, and the colonized (in this case, the Palestinian) a passive receiver, either by being the object of study or by being able to merely produce information about his or her society and only in rare cases key analytical approaches. The Palestinian has not been expected to critically analyze Zionism or Jewish settlers; for years, knowledge has flowed predominantly in one direction. Reflecting this pattern, the number of Palestinian scholars whose works have been overlooked is considerable. The work of the Palestinian-Canadian feminist sociologist Nahla Abdo on Zionist settler colonialism in the 1990s was largely unnoticed, even as parts of her arguments were picked up by non-Palestinian scholars.⁵⁷ For example, her 1990 article “Racism, Zionism and the Palestinian Working Class, 1920–1947” offers a uniquely prescient theorization of settler colonial elimination, nationalism, and racism alongside class.

In a settler-colonial state, the repressive nature of nationalist policies exerts additional pressures on the “natives” or indigenous population. Thus, in addition to class and gender contradictions which are characteristic of all capitalist systems, a settler-colonial regime

produces other particular forms of contradictions expressed in the cultural/national negation and the subordination of the “native” or indigenous population.⁵⁸

The occlusion of Abdo’s work, which predates the more recent settler colonial paradigm developed by Wolfe and others, reflects a wider structure of knowledge production in Israel.

The misrecognition of indigenous knowledge overlooks alternative boundaries of meanings. Indigenous knowledge could be both methodologically rigorous (in terms of political and cultural sensitives) and simultaneously grounded in place and experience (as outsiders and insiders, or “the outsider within”).⁵⁹ In tracing the settler colonial paradigm, I am suggesting that Israeli critical sociology, albeit groundbreaking, has suffered from a myopia engendered through hegemony. We must ask, How are different works received across different political temporalities, and why do they appear at the times they do? Comparing the reception of these sociologies demonstrates the fissures, and changes, that constitute the development of sociology in Israel, as I explore below.

Postcolonial Studies

Postcolonial theory focuses on the pervasive political and cultural ramifications of colonialism for society, especially in the colonies, during the colonial regime and after the process of formal decolonization. Principally developed by Third World scholars based in North America and Europe, postcolonial theory explores forms of violence and abuses of power that endure even after formal decolonization. Postcolonialism’s contribution to sociology and history has largely been to trace coloniality in the center of European identity and assert the incommensurability of Western universalism on the colonized.⁶⁰ It examines neocolonialist structures of power in the relations between colonized and colonial countries postindependence, showing how formerly colonized societies remain reconfigured by deep colonial structures. Postcolonial scholarship also demonstrates that political independence alone cannot provide a remedy for ingrained inequalities and power differentials. In settler colonial cases it offered a grammar to deconstruct the ethnic and gender hierarchies among the settler colonial group, the reproduced structures of hegemony inside it, and the residues of domination.

In the case of Israel, works by Said, Memmi, Fanon, Bhabha, Spivak, and others were enlisted by Israeli researchers to criticize the hegemonic white Ashkenazi Zionist project, bringing the Mizrahi Jewish gaze to the analysis of society and culture in Israel. Research projects were based, for example, on Homi K. Bhabha’s theory of “hybridity” and on the field of Subaltern studies, demonstrating how the racialization of Mizrahi Israelis contributed to their cultural and political degradation.⁶¹ It is likely that postcolonial theory has also paved the way for wider reception of the settler colonial paradigm by raising an epistemological challenge and creating an opening for new forms of scholarship, including the settler colonial paradigm.

Although postcolonial theoreticians often argue that the theory depicts the present as well as the colonial past—and although they insist that in the formulation “post(-)

colonial” the hyphen marks not the end of colonialism but its continuation—the application of this analytical framework in Israel, especially in the field of cultural criticism, has resulted in a muddled epistemological analysis of colonialism as existing only in the past tense. The approach produced a false consciousness, premised on an analogy between the situation in Israel and postcolonial situations around the world after the wave of decolonization in the 1950s and 1960s—an analogy perhaps reinforced by illusions tied to the Oslo peace process. The postcolonial approach focused on cultural aspects (race, ethnicity, and gender) rather than material aspects (class, resources, capital, Jewish privileges) or the social-colonial aspects of relations between the colonizers and the colonized. That narrow focus, perhaps, has been the most incisive reason for postcolonialism’s limited impact in discussions of the Israeli-Palestinian case. While I hesitate to crudely classify the work as superstructural in the Marxist sense, it does not necessarily offer adequate tools to explore the evidently material circumstances, or the system of ethnic privilege within a persistent settler colonial apparatus, which continues to reinscribe Jewish privileges. At the same time, Israeli scholars have drawn selectively on postcolonial work. Many scholars, for example, adopted the general themes of Said’s *Orientalism* that deals with Western Eurocentric hegemony. But they did not deal with its sections on Zionism, or with *The Question of Palestine*, or his essay “Zionism from the Standpoint of Its Victims,” where he articulates the Palestinian-Zionist encounter in a settler colonial framework.⁶² Similarly, they preferred the postcolonial Fanon of *Black Skin, White Masks*, which explores race and identity, to the anticolonial Fanon of *The Wretched on the Earth*, which deals with colonial structures and anticolonial resistance.⁶³

In contrast to the first phase of settler colonial analysis, which did not produce a significant analytic framework in the humanities and social sciences in Israel, the postcolonial paradigm spread like wildfire in Israeli academia and was integrated into manifold courses, academic conferences, and studies. Why the settler colonial paradigm did not gain as strong a foothold in relation to postcolonialism is an epistemological issue related to the production of hegemonic knowledge in Israel. While the postcolonial critique challenges Zionist ideology, it remains largely in the confines of self-examination and has not generated a critical language that might help “to create effective resistance to the regime.”⁶⁴

Adherents of the postcolonial approach in Israel did refer, albeit not extensively, to the existence of colonialism in the Palestinian territories occupied in 1967. However, as far as the question of 1948 was concerned, they tended to consign the colonial issue to the past, taking Israel within the Green Line as a given. Although the postcolonial approach did help to start theoretically dismantling class, gender-based, ethnic, and racial discrimination in Israeli society—thereby subverting the “we” of the nation⁶⁵—it remained confined to the framework of liberal critics, failing to challenge the essence of the Zionist project as institutionalized in the “Jewish-democratic” state. Thus, while some Palestinians in Israel may be sympathetic to the plight of Mizrahi Jews—both in the Arab countries from which they emigrated and in Israel—and recognize their marginal status within the Zionist project, they have generally perceived the postcolonial approach and the critical Mizrahi activists in Israel as seeking distributive “justice” for

Mizrahi Jews alone, without questioning the provenance of the wealth and resources accumulated in the colonial process or concerns related to Palestinians. Although Israeli sociology incorporated some of postcolonialism's insights, namely, identifying the orientalist yearnings in political practices, those insights were limited historically and not extended to a reexamination of the treatment of indigenous Palestinians.

Two Israeli researchers have recently posed a contemporary challenge to these approaches. Yali Hashash criticizes the failure of the postcolonial approach to examine historical links between poverty and colonialism, including the way poverty was used to consolidate colonial control in metropolises and colonies.⁶⁶ Smadar Sharon tackles the question of settler colonial practices through her research on the colonization practices of Mizrahi immigrant settlement in the Lachish region (previously Asqalan) in Israel during the 1950s.⁶⁷ These studies address issues that have usually been discussed separately in Israel: the settler colonial question (or the "Israeli-Palestinian conflict," to use the more commonly accepted term) and the question of ethnic and gender inequality in Israel.

However, as we shall see below, the most significant work on settler colonialism has been done by Palestinian researchers. They have taken up the analytic of settler colonialism and made the case that other paradigms are inadequate to explain or account for empirical realities under Israeli domination, given that land expropriation is the centerpiece. Postcolonialism, for example, is conceptually inadequate not only on the temporal question of the "post"—since there has been no Palestinian "independence" to speak of—but also because its theories generally describe nations that were formerly franchise colonies, not settler colonies.

The Development of the Settler Colonial Paradigm in Research by Palestinians

Although the case of Palestine/Israel bears similarities to other cases of settler colonialism, until recently many Palestinian researchers avoided drawing such comparisons, possibly because in other cases, groups of settlers allegedly "succeeded" in eliminating the vast majority of indigenous peoples. Usually, remaining indigenous groups became (over the course of centuries) dependent sovereigns with distinct polities and (limited) rights to self-determination. Their sovereignties were confined to specific reservation geographies rather than to entire homelands framed by national expression, statist models, and recognition as separate nation-states.⁶⁸ Yasser Arafat bluntly expressed this perception in a famous interview carried out in June 1987: "It's impossible to wipe out five million Palestinians. We are not Indians."⁶⁹ The hegemonic Palestinian discourse thus has been entrapped within a Western nationalist model that politically subordinates indigenous peoples.

It is a fact that Palestinians resisted, clung to their land, and succeeded in constituting a national group in line with the hegemonic modern form of nationalist framing. They saw national liberation as a more forward-looking and ongoing articulation of this ideology, which might have contributed to a lack of attention to the settler colonial paradigm as a possible prism through which to analyze the Palestinian case. The

Palestinian sociologist Hilal has proposed, further, that the adoption of the two-state solution model by the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) and the signing of the Oslo Accords indirectly led to the recognition of “the Zionist movement as it presents itself, as a liberation movement and not a settler colonial movement.”⁷⁰ Although the claim concerning the indirect recognition of Zionism as a liberation movement is exaggerated, there is no doubt that the signing of the Oslo Accords led to the recognition of Zionism as a national movement and to a perception of the conflict as between two such movements rather than between a settler-colonial national movement and an indigenous national movement.

However, the events of recent years have brought the settler colonial paradigm back to the forefront. In addition to its growing visibility in the international sphere and its impact locally, the application of this paradigm in the Palestinian arena has been an intellectual development responsive to political and social change. Recourse to the settler colonial paradigm was associated with several interrelated factors: the failure of the Oslo Accords, the revival of the PLO’s status following the establishment of the Palestinian National Authority, the decline of the Palestinian nationalist and socialist political movements in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, the rising power of Hamas (the Islamic Jihad movement), the absence of a comprehensive national Palestinian project capable of challenging Israel, and the associated increase in the importance of Palestinian citizens of Israel in the resurgent dialogue between all parts of the Palestinian people (including the refugees and the diaspora).

The late 1990s witnessed a shift in Palestinian society in Israel. During the military rule and until nearly the mid-1990s, memories of the Nakba among Palestinians were suppressed, but through symbolic marches and the arts, the remembrance of the Nakba developed gradually into a public display of traumatic affect, leading to an eventual “return of history” in anticolonial political discourse, with a social movement demanding a state for all citizens. Following a period of ongoing struggle, the Nakba conception became a major force in the contemporary national and collective cultural consciousness among Palestinians in Israel, as well as in their political activism. The “return of history” of the Nakba to the public sphere and the tradition of the Nakba march that began in 1998, along with the loss of hope for an overall political settlement, brought back to the Palestinian national awareness the depth of the conflict and the perception of the Zionist movement and of Israel itself as a settler colonial project, a perception that had been widespread among the Palestinian community prior to 1948.⁷¹ The perception became prominent in formulations of the “future vision documents” published by various Palestinian groups in Israel between 2006 and 2007 under the auspices of the National Committee and civil society.⁷²

This revitalized consciousness also gained a footing among Palestinian researchers and academics in Israel, whose knowledge of Jewish society and culture and command of Hebrew enabled them to address the Zionist project in its own terms.⁷³ Palestinian scholars of the second and third generations of the Nakba are playing a central role in theorizing and promoting the settler colonial paradigm among Palestinian students in Israeli universities and research centers, as well as in Palestinian academic circles in the West Bank. As the works of Ghanim, Mustafa and Ghanem, Sabbagh-Khoury,

Nasasra, Abu-Saad, Shalhoub-Kevorkian, Amara, Tatour, Rouhana, Shihade, Saadi, Zreik, Jamal, Abu-Rabia-Queder, Nashif, and others illustrate, these are not merely individual efforts but rather constitute a collective endeavor, exploring these issues across research groups, seminars, and conferences.⁷⁴

The first research group on settler colonialism inside Israel was launched in 2015 by Mada al-Carmel, the Arab Center for Applied Social Research in Haifa,⁷⁵ bringing Palestinian graduate students from Israel and the West Bank together with prominent researchers in the field. A further initiative led also by a Palestinian scholar was based in the Humanities Center of Tel Aviv University.⁷⁶ These initiatives are reshaping patterns of collaboration with academic institutions and Jewish researchers and are redirecting the flow of knowledge production. Seminars and workshops—formerly almost always conducted in Israeli institutions and in Hebrew—are now also conducted in Palestinian research centers in Arabic or English.

Although the number of Palestinian researchers who focus on the paradigm remains small (and the number of Palestinians in Israeli universities' social science and humanities departments is still very limited), their presence in the Israeli academy is significantly more noticeable today than in previous years, and these collaborations are producing new forms of knowledge. Such developments represent a paradigmatic shift, accompanied by changes in methodology, corpuses of testimonies, and thematic emphases. Oral history methodologies are gaining increasing recognition: the process of listening to the stories of displaced Palestinians has increased the perception of the Zionist endeavor as a settler colonial project and added a countermemory to the hegemonic historical narrative. At the same time, new archival materials are being exposed and classified in relation to these stories (although the optimism of the 1990s turned out to be unfounded).⁷⁷ Unlike previous Palestinian research, which has mostly been concerned with responses to the Zionist narrative, the new inquiries offer in-depth analyses of the history and reality of Palestine and the Palestinians, based on the voices of the subjugated and on the work of researchers who have shattered Zionist myths.

This work accentuates the settler colonial component, probing Zionist practices and developing theoretical frameworks that simultaneously address settlers and the indigenous Israelis and the Palestinians. It also unpacks the ways Palestinians navigated ongoing settler colonial processes over the last century, and rather than merely focusing on Zionist ideology, it centers on the phenomenon of indigenous resistance and the critique of Zionism and Zionist practices. Through their involvement in the struggle, and bringing their own experiences of oppression to bear, these scholars are introducing grounded spheres of indigenous knowledge into the settler colonial paradigm. In so doing, they concretely demonstrate that the Nakba, the Palestinian catastrophe, is an ongoing process rather than an exceptional event relegated to the past.

These developments are not unique to knowledge production in Israel. The Third World/Global South perspective has resulted in critical theorization in various research fields around the world; for example, in the past three decades, native/indigenous scholars in North America have argued that the history of genocide and extermination continues to constitute a major feature of the country and are making renewed claims for sovereignty or tribal sovereignty.⁷⁸ Indeed, it could be argued that the use of the

settler colonial paradigm in the Israeli context was enabled not only by changes in Palestinian society but also by analyses of the Israeli-Palestinian case carried out by prominent researchers in the West. Although the settler colonial paradigm influenced some of the work carried out by Palestinian and Arab scholars before the current phase, that earlier work was largely occluded from the canon in Israel and ignored by Western academia. As is often the case, colonial power relations were reproduced in the intellectual and academic field, as the work of Israeli and other Western scholars, particularly Ashkenazi or white ones, has been disseminated more broadly—even when that work reproduces analyses published by Palestinian scholars.⁷⁹ That trend reflects the colonial (Zionist supremacist) and racial (white supremacist) dimensions of the hierarchization of Israeli academic knowledge, along with a touch of Eurocentrism and masculinity. Even among critical work, the hegemonic paradigm is often reflected in discussions of Israeli political structures, shaping who speaks for whom, by what means, for which audiences, and to what reception. These questions are all pertinent to the sociology of knowledge production. Said's notion of "permission to narrate" articulates precisely what is at stake politically through the relationship between power and knowledge.⁸⁰ Still, it would be difficult to trace the development of settler colonial studies had this theorizing not been adopted by Western theoreticians such as Patrick Wolfe, Caroline Elkins and Susan Pederson, Lorenzo Veracini, and others.

The Paradigm in Its Local Context: Relevance, Complexity, and Challenges

Among the new debates provoked by the settler colonial paradigm, questions about the character of popular struggle and its goals may be the most challenging. The national-Zionist narrative analyzes 1948 as a war between two national movements, obscuring the violent practices and colonization that preceded 1948, and limiting, if at all, any colonialist character to the Zionist occupation of Palestinian territories in 1967.⁸¹ By contrast, the settler colonial paradigm brings the discussion back within the "borders" of the Green Line, reexamining the historical and continuing practices of Zionist settlement and the varied forms of resistance by the indigenous people. It brings attention to the organizing principle of the Zionist project, namely, the persistent desire to acquire and occupy land and to displace the indigenous population and replace it with Jewish settlers. Even those who allegedly adhered to a socialist and binationalist ideology were party to the forcible displacement of Palestinians, whether directly or indirectly.⁸²

Examining the conflict through the lens of settler colonialism, Gadi Algazi argues, allows one to comprehend it as "a process and not an event," an idea that he proposes to complement Wolfe's well-known formula, "invasion is a structure, not an event."⁸³ This perspective, according to Sabbagh-Khoury,⁸⁴ enables seeing the Nakba as a cumulative and ongoing process of displacement of the indigenous Palestinian population that began long before 1948, as opposed to viewing 1948 as the methodological "zero point." The phrasing "a process and not an event," I would argue, enables

simultaneous tracing of both settlement practices and resistance by the indigenous—or what J. Kēhaulani Kauanui terms “enduring indigeneity”⁸⁵—incorporating the dynamism of social processes and restoring the place of the indigenous to history, two components that are not central in Wolfe’s account. The shift enables a view in which “the Nakba is ongoing” (*al-nakba al-mustamirra*), a political assertion now prevalent in Palestinian political discourse and in scholarly Arab writings.

Thus, while recognizing Zionism’s consistent logic regarding elimination and replacement of the indigenous, this perspective acknowledges that the implementation by Israel has shifted according to different and overlapping geographies or temporalities, for two fundamental reasons. First, there is no single overarching settler Zionist ideology. Despite the coherent and powerful organization of Zionism, there is some variation between the ideologies that prevailed in the Zionist colony before 1948, those during the 1948 war and after, those at play in 1967 occupation, and those in the post-1967 era. Current versions are generally dominated by a religious logic of colonization, a significant change from past iterations of Zionist thought. These dynamics within Zionism, together with the inception of Israeli sovereignty in 1948, arguably transformed the settler colonial structure(s). Second, and dialectically, changes have occurred in the historical and conceptual relations of the indigenous Palestinians to colonization, in their location on the land, and in their modes of resistance and their expressions of sovereignty through time. While the reconfigurations of Zionism may be incorporated within the sustained violence of the structure of settler colonialism, Palestinian resistance and survival disrupts this structure and shapes its transformation.

This dialectical process highlights one aspect of the Israeli-Palestinian case that is perhaps less explicit in most examples of settler colonialism—the rejection of assimilation of the natives. While the Israeli state demands loyalty from the indigenous Palestinian citizens of Israel, it does not aim to embrace them within the Jewish-Israeli framework of the nation, as its unifying factor is not Israeliness but Jewishness (which, in itself, has also undergone a major transformation). A further characteristic of the Zionist project is its reliance on religion and the connection of the Jewish people to *Eretz Yisrael* (the “Land of Israel”).⁸⁶ However, the religious perception of Jews as “returnees” to a “promised land” does not detract from the settler colonial nature of the project, since its problematic aspect lies not in the “return” of the Jews or the constitution of the Jews as a ethno-national group but rather in their settling in (as opposed to immigrating to) a homeland that was and is inhabited by Palestinians. The Palestinians, as Rashid Khalidi shows in his study of the articulation of Palestinian identity during the Ottoman period (1908–14),⁸⁷ were not opposed to the presence of Jews in Palestine but rather to the settler colonial features of Zionism and to its objective of establishing a national homeland for Jews in their own, that is, the Palestinian, homeland.

Another distinctive characteristic of the Israeli-Palestinian instance is, again, the specific and changing contours of Zionism and its successor, the State of Israel, and the extent to which they were profoundly shaped by their interaction with the indigenous people, through the political struggles of the latter and the various sub-Palestinian groups into which they were divided. Each group had its own struggle, but all were

united in reclaiming either a part of the homeland (Palestinians in the 1967 Occupied Palestinian Territories) or recovering the entire homeland (primarily the Palestinians in Israel and the refugees). No other case of settler colonialism involves a convoluted situation of this kind, in which a section of the indigenous population became refugees, claiming the right to return to their homeland, while a considerable indigenous minority population became citizens, challenging the definition of the nation-state as exclusively for the settlers, as in the case of the Palestinians in Israel. Notwithstanding the major differences between the platforms of the political parties that represent them, they share the demand for egalitarian citizenship and the dismantling of ethnically prioritized Jewish privileges, and their decolonial struggles are distinguished by a resistance to war and militarism.

In some cases of settler colonialism, including Canada or the United States, federally recognized tribal nations exercise limited self-determination over their own citizens on their respective reservations. By contrast, Palestinian citizens in Israel challenge the very foundation of Israel as a Jewish state and demand a complete rearticulation of sovereignty over the entire homeland colonized in 1948 (which is not to argue that indigenous peoples elsewhere do not also contest settler sovereignty).⁸⁸ This particular feature may be attributable to the fact that the Zionist movement emerged at a later stage than did other settler colonial projects; to the entanglement of the colonial project in the process of nation formation; and to the resistance of the indigenous people at a time when both the Palestinians and the Zionists were evolving as national groups. Further, unlike other cases of settler colonialism, Palestine was already tightly integrated into the capitalist world system. Whereas elsewhere the settler colonization process was concurrent with the establishment of modern state power, private property in land, and export-oriented commodity production, Palestine had already been incorporated into those structures when the Zionist movement launched its accumulation project in Palestine.

Although Zionist aspirations of establishing a homeland for the Jews predated the Holocaust, the genocide of European Jewry is yet another distinctive feature of the settler colonial project in Palestine.⁸⁹ There are other cases of settlers who experienced persecution and discrimination, but in no other case had the settlers themselves experienced genocide.⁹⁰ Importantly, the Zionist solution to the “Jewish question” had not always been the hegemonic position among world Jewry; but the Holocaust largely rendered alternative political options insignificant. Sympathy for the Jewish case within the international community generated by the persecution of the European Jews also increased international backing for the partition of Palestine between Palestinians (the majority of the population at the time) and Jews (then a minority). In parallel, antisemitism and the lack of welcome for Jewish immigration in North America, in addition to the previous waves of European colonization, inspired the Zionists to aspire to settle a separate territory and establish a sovereign state that would realize Jewish collective rights. Although independent settler nations would eventually develop in other cases of settler colonialism, the Zionist case is distinctive in that the settler colonial project was based on an aspiration for national self-determination that stemmed from the social and political persecution the settlers faced in their countries

of prior residence. According to Elkins and Pederson, among settler colonial cases, the Zionist case is “the only case of successful settler nation building.”⁹¹

Another unusual characteristic of the case is that the Zionist national narrative ignores the imperial matrix and instead emphasizes the context of anti-imperialism.⁹² Paradoxically, Jewish-Israeli scholars discussing Jewish-Israeli society rarely draw on the ample research on empires and colonialism, including work done by Israeli academics. By contrast, analyzing the conflict from within the settler colonial paradigm highlights the Zionist movement’s relationship with metropolitan centers, particularly Britain, under whose auspices the Zionist project became viable—a reality generally denied in Zionist narratives, despite the 1917 Balfour Declaration and the significant support that ensued. Some settlers regarded themselves as natives, and a few groups even perceived themselves to be living under the control of a foreign imperial power. In this well-known narrative, the establishment of the state in 1948 is viewed as a process of gaining independence from British rule (the 1948 war was coined the “War of Independence”). However, this supposedly anticolonial aspect is another essential marker of settler colonialism, which according to Veracini is characterized by two core elements: the significance attributed by settlers to their autonomy from external settler agents (i.e., the metropolite or mother country) and the subordination of the natives.⁹³ In order to determine that the British Empire is a critical component of the “theory of adequate causation and objective possibility” (in Weber’s terms), it is sufficient to ask, What would have happened if the Zionist movement had not received the support of the British Empire during the essential phases of the Mandate, and if the empire had not prevented the development of Palestinian proto-sovereign institutions while eroding the power of the Palestinian community during the Arab Revolt of 1936–39?

An earlier Arab and Palestinian tradition of analysis, which can be called “imperial,”⁹⁴ indeed recognized the vital role of the empire’s support to the success of the Zionist movement. However, it often examined the conflict solely through the lens of imperial interests. From that perspective, local conflicts lose their importance. Conversely, the settler colonial paradigm emphasizes the Jewish settlers’ relative autonomy on the frontier in comparison with the British Empire. For Palestinians, analyzing the conflict in the framework of the settler colonial paradigm helps in understanding the defeat of 1948. The addition of the metropolitan factor, in conjunction with the role played by the League of Nations, underscores the fact that the Zionist project acquired much of its power from the dispersed metropole(s), which provided the political auspices for and much of the wealth behind the colonization enterprise.

These distinctions raise a series of questions, the most important of which is the future development of Palestinian liberation in light of the history of Zionist settler colonialism and the need for decolonization. On the one hand is the supposed “defeat” of the colonized as seen in the model of the United States, Australia, or Canada (which should not be viewed as absolute or final given the ongoing struggles of the indigenous peoples). On the other hand is the Algerian model, which saw the defeat of the colonizers and their return to their metropolitan sphere.

The Algerian case has been an important point of reference in the Israeli-Palestinian political context, as Palestinians have historically looked to Algeria as a successful

model of the struggle for liberation and decolonization, which notably included the training the PLO received from Algerian nationalists during the 1970s. Yet scholars are ambivalent about including French Algeria in the settler colonial framework, mainly for two reasons. First, Wolfe's framing of "invasion is a structure" assumes that settlers come to stay, whereas in French Algeria defeated settlers returned to France, with Algeria subsequently becoming a postcolonial nation. Second, the French settlers did not aim to replace the Algerians entirely, as they did in most other cases of settler colonialism.⁹⁵ As an illuminating special issue of the journal *Settler Colonial Studies* titled "Settler Colonialism and French Algeria" argues, while there is good reason to include this instance in the settler colonial framework, connecting Algeria to ongoing scholarship on settler colonialism will require more labor.

For the Israeli context, at least for some, the Algerian model raises at least two pertinent questions. The first is whether the decolonization of Eretz Yisrael (historic Palestine) might mean the defeat of the settlers through violent liberation, potentially entailing the return of the Jewish Israelis to their countries of origin. The second relates to those who reflect on the 1967 paradigm, cautioning that mass armed resistance might be employed by Palestinians to end the occupation, resembling the violence of the Algerian war of independence (1954–62).

However, arguably, most Israelis see no resemblance between the two cases, since most Zionists do not perceive of themselves as colonial settlers. Others may reject the comparison with French Algeria because of its prior status as a colony across the sea from the colonial metropolis (France) rather than an ancestral land where the French lived before the Algerians, as Zionists understand the case of Jewish (re)settlement in Palestine. Furthermore, the French do not claim sacred places in the land of Algeria, a major difference with the Zionist movement (and subsequently Israel), which claims a historic-religious connection with the "land of Israel."

Thus, the case of Palestine/Israel poses a challenge: since one cannot credibly speak of the "defeat" of the indigenous peoples (as the Palestinians continue to resist and demand to reconfigure the Israeli mode of sovereignty) or of the return of the Jewish immigrant-settlers to their countries of origin, a third model must be developed that comprehends the coexistence of these two groups. This context raises questions regarding alternative structures based not on Jewish privilege and Palestinian subjugation (whether under the Jewish state or under military occupation), and regarding processes of decolonization that might safeguard the national rights of both Israeli Jews and Palestinians. A theoretical model of this sort is currently growing in the hands of Palestinian researchers and political activists who are citizens of Israel, as well as among a few radical academic groups.

Another case study that might be brought into the discussion is that of settler colonialism and apartheid in South Africa, particularly regarding future outcomes of settler and indigenous relations. The settlers came to stay in South Africa, as they did in the case of Algeria, aiming not to entirely remove the indigenous but to exploit their workforce. Such juxtapositions between historical cases highlight the divergent qualities in settler colonialism as a land-centered project. The South African case needs to be further elaborated, first for the manner in which settler colonialism morphed into a new

national entity, for the apartheid mechanisms of segregation and confinement of indigenous communities to enclaves, and for the mechanism of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) that is claimed to have continued the transition with relatively little violence, although such structure must also be critically evaluated. Apartheid has been probed from a comparative perspective in the Palestinian case primarily by Palestinian scholars (not necessarily in the framework of the settler colonial paradigm) and is popular among Palestinian activists.⁹⁶ However, mechanisms of decolonization have not yet been thoroughly excavated.⁹⁷ The comparison to apartheid has been made beyond juridical stances, through both sociological and anticolonial means. The generative works of both Ran Greenstein and Mona Younis are pertinent in this regard.⁹⁸ Greenstein relates to the structures of class, identity, and state formation, arguing that South Africa's political case emerged through an incorporationist (though fractured) manner, while in the case of Israel/Palestine the historical formations became more exclusionary. Younis draws on the comparison between the Palestinian national liberation movement and the African National Congress in South Africa, examining the commensurable tools used by each liberation group (boycotts, popular committees, etc.) and identifying the relative failures of the PLO and the PA (Palestinian Authority) when compared to South Africa. Both analyses are useful with regard to the comparative study of settler colonial and indigenous societies, wherein they center on state processes and structural conditions of racial hierarchy, as well as on popular mobilizations and practices of resistance.

Transnational political support should be articulated alongside intellectual trends by drawing on decolonial contexts, although they may be distinct. Palestinians have garnered inspiration from the struggle against apartheid in South Africa, which is partly reflected in the goals of the Boycott, Divestment, and Sanctions (BDS) movement: "Inspired by the South African anti-apartheid movement, the BDS call urges action to pressure Israel to comply with international law."⁹⁹ Still, the enduring settler colonialism in the case of Palestine may be prohibiting the development of similar "resolution" tactics (such as a TRC) as in the case of South Africa. Scholars also must be attentive to the residues of colonial domination that continue to structure, or reconfigure, South African inequality.¹⁰⁰ Notably, the South African TRC's process and impact had real limitations and did not deal with, for example, reparations. Nevertheless, the comparison might be useful in the framework of a developing decolonization literature, to explore new trajectories for resistance and to animate possible future solutions, even as it may not be a model given South Africa's deficiencies in truly redressing colonization.

Despite the settler colonial structure and the enduring hostility, which is especially explicit during times of crisis, Palestinian and Jewish societies in Israel have nonetheless developed close human connections. A phenomenological analysis of the encounter between the two societies unveils the complexity of their relationship, which is interwoven with multiple contradictions, and also outlines theoretical possibilities for decolonization. In other words, the development of the settler colonial paradigm is crucial not only in reflecting the political reality but also in considering possibilities that are not bound to the existing research and to political hegemony. Since settler

colonialism captures both the settlers and the natives (including the researchers) in their hierarchical relationships, the sociology of knowledge I have described thus far—and the phenomenology presented below—offer possibilities for the deconstruction of such relationships, while illuminating alternatives for coexistence.

By an indigenous approach I mean one that incorporates the critical work of indigenous scholars whose conceptual work and intellectual labor inform activism and sociopolitical discourse and challenge epistemic violence. An indigenous approach makes visible the ongoing structure of settler colonialism and reflects on what Kauanui calls the “enduring indigeneity” of the colonized, not merely to ensure that the colonized voices are raised within academic analyses but rather to decolonize and dismantle settler colonialism and build a just political situation.

Sociology as an intellectual practice is not disconnected from the wider political arena; knowledge production *is* bound up with power.¹⁰¹ My articulation as such is inspired by, although it extends, Marxist analysis in the following two ways. First, Marx and Engels argue that ruling ideas are simply an “ideal expression” of the regnant material relationships.¹⁰² We must keep this in mind to understand the formation of hegemonic knowledge. Settler colonialism, after all, allows the settler to dominate material (not solely class in a capitalist sense), cultural, and ideological resources. Yet, and second, Louis Althusser’s intervention adds the impetus of revolution/resistance: that philosophy is an inherently political tool for class struggle, which we can extend to academic knowledge in general and to other struggles. He writes, “In scientific and philosophical reasoning, the words (concepts, categories) are ‘instruments’ of knowledge. But in political, ideological and philosophical struggle, the words are also weapons, explosives or tranquilizers and poisons.”¹⁰³ In this way, knowledge production is an indispensable tool for struggle. Althusser accentuates that the intellectuals of the proletariat must perform a radical revolution in their thoughts in order to ideate for the working class. As settler colonialism is a struggle of materialism, I argue in a parallel way that critical intellectuals, especially indigenous scholars, must carry out a radical theorizing, especially if disruptive to the colonial apparatus. Just as “Marxist-Leninist philosophy is therefore one of the two theoretical weapons indispensable to the class struggle of the proletariat,”¹⁰⁴ so too is the critical settler colonial paradigm indispensable to the indigenous struggle of liberation and decolonization. If we ponder Marx, Engels, and Althusser together, we can better comprehend the indispensability of seemingly esoteric trends and trajectories of intellectual knowledge production that are predicated on subaltern sociopolitical positions and experiences. While it is the political praxis (including the “return of history” and international solidarity) that allows for the intellectual change, it is the scholar’s role (beside the activists’) to propel thoughts into political actions and contribute to the articulation of just political projects. As Yara Hawari, Sharri Plonski, and Elian Weizman argue, the settler colonial framework is a necessary tool in anticolonial liberation praxis and decolonization.¹⁰⁵

The intellectual, thereby, is implicated as a subject with great responsibility. In this sense, Antonio Gramsci articulates the role of the “organic intellectual” in countering hegemony (while for him it will always be the mass who can precipitate revolution),

and Said sees a powerful role for the intellectual as someone who can contest conventions and institutions, and be wholly invested in critique, for a public.¹⁰⁶ Here, too, feminist thought and theory becomes crucial, as its analytical innovation has been its implications for transforming the public space and for its articulation of a feminist liberation project. In the tradition of feminist thought, scholarship works toward identifying structural conditions and social constructions of gender, critiquing masculinist power and patriarchy and centering the subjectivity that has been poignantly absent from much intellectual criticism.¹⁰⁷ This certainly is not a departure from struggling over material conditions but a way of reflecting on additional frames that structure society: gender, sexuality, and race, which are contingent formations that interact and intersect divergently across geographies and temporalities.¹⁰⁸ As Raewyn Connell has exemplified in her work on feminism, the circulation of knowledge is political; education is often the most crucial tool in contesting hegemony.¹⁰⁹ In a similar vein, we must recognize how the circulation of the settler colonial paradigm not only contributes to an indictment of power structures but counters with a different way of being in the world, a model of relations and sociality predicated on the disposal of colonial privileges and the envisioning of a just future for all.

A Decolonizing Lens: Toward a Phenomenology of Relations between Palestinian Citizens in Israel and Israeli Society

Military rule and the associated restrictions on movement that were imposed on the Palestinian citizens in Israel often hindered the development of direct relationships between Palestinians and Jews in Israel. Such relationships slowly began to develop during the 1960s, with the gradual and partial decrease of supervision, among colleagues and in workplaces, trade, universities, hospitals, etc. These relations are more common between Palestinians and Israelis who live in what are known as “mixed cities.” Although interactions remain limited in scope, Palestinians in Israel have developed both an external and an internal standpoint—socially, culturally, and politically—toward Jewish Israelis, through personal, professional, and familial relationships and by being part of the social and political fabric in Israel. The engagement of Palestinians in Israel’s political system contributed significantly to shaping their comprehension of the community of the “other,” a community whose language and culture they know far better than Jewish citizens of Israel know the language and culture of the Palestinian community.

The encounter between Palestinians in Israel and Jewish Israelis is markedly different from that between Jewish Israelis and Palestinians in the 1967 Occupied Palestinian Territories, as the latter is based on military occupation. The latter is an encounter that usually takes place in checkpoints, blockades, and prisons and in confrontations with soldiers and settlers. From the standpoint of Palestinians in those locations, Jewish citizens/settlers are first and foremost the enemy and the colonizer. However, the situation is more complicated for Palestinians in Israel, for whom members of the Jewish

community may be colleagues, clients, patients, therapists, doctors, students, or teachers with whom they interact daily.

The experience of Palestinians in Israel is also profoundly different from that of Palestinian refugees in the diaspora, for whom Israeli Jews are the invaders who appropriated their homes and homeland. From the standpoint of many Palestinian refugees, time remains frozen in 1948. In a study conducted by Yasir Suleiman, when Palestinians from the diaspora were asked to describe how they envision Palestine and their exile, their answers imagined Palestine without a Jewish presence.¹¹⁰ Although they regard Israeli Jews as invaders and occupiers, when they envision Palestine, the Jewish daily existence does not form part of their consciousness. Asking Palestinians in Israel the same questions would likely yield different results. The perception of time and space for the Palestinians in Israel has been shaped in part by their interactions with the Israeli Jews, in a Palestinian space that has undergone a deep and yet partial transformative process of erasure and destruction.

In light of this, we can understand why Palestinians in Israel were among the first Palestinians to advance visions of binationalism, which they did in the late-1990s.¹¹¹ They proposed an intellectual debate about the possibility of transforming the settlers into natives and using the framework of decolonization to articulate historical options of reconciliation, with the binational state model as a moral and practical framework.¹¹² I would argue that those propositions reflect the political positionality of Palestinians in Israel as a relatively privileged group in comparison with those who live under the 1967 Occupation or as refugees; they also reflect the fact that Palestinians in Israel are able to contemplate the position of the colonizers and their future, despite the oppressive apparatus of the state toward them and the involvement of Jewish citizens in that apparatus.¹¹³

Furthermore, Palestinians in Israel arguably have the strongest investment in a civil resistance, especially compared to other Palestinian communities, whether in the occupied territories or the refugee population. Palestinians in Israel, as a minority population, have a structural interest in abolishing the settler colonial apparatus while retaining the economic and professional advantages they have acquired as citizens.

In the Palestinian National Charter of the PLO, the Jews in Palestine were perceived as a religious community rather than a national group. In contrast, a number of Palestinian researchers in Israel are currently promoting the settler colonial paradigm, while simultaneously raising a debate on the need to recognize the Jewish Israeli community as a national group within the framework of decolonization and the necessary relinquishment by Jewish Israelis of some of their privileges. Within this discussion, the researchers distinguish between the recognition of Zionism and the recognition of its products. Their arguments have gained some traction within Israel and among Palestinians in the West Bank and the diaspora. However, these positions, which are also expressed in future vision documents published by Palestinian organizations in Israel discussing the collective rights of Israeli Jews, are often received with understandable criticism from Palestinians living under occupation in the West Bank.¹¹⁴

In Bordieuan terms, the Palestinian citizens in Israel have developed cultural and social capital, which they can use to study Israel and Zionism. Many of the Palestinians

(in general) who are studying Israel and Zionism are Palestinians in Israel who know Israeli culture and the Hebrew language well, and who enjoy relative ease of access to Israeli archives. They are not only engaged in research and academic projects in Israel, but also in projects in the 1967 Occupied Palestinian Territories, such as those of MADAR (the Palestinian Forum for Israeli Studies in Ramallah), Masarat, the Palestinian Center for Policy Research and Strategic Studies in Ramallah, the Institute for Palestinian Studies in Ramallah, and the Israeli Studies Master's Degree Program at Birzeit University.

There is virtually no comparable process in Jewish-Israeli society, even in the academic field. Most Jews perceive themselves as the owners of the homeland, which they regard as exclusively their own. They do not view themselves as colonizers and do not recognize the indigeneity of Palestinians, or even the collective rights of Palestinians in Israel as a national group; at best, they see Palestinians in Israel as strangers with Israeli citizenship who are granted liberal political rights within the Jewish state.

What would change if the settler colonial paradigm became more widely adopted across Israeli society? I am not arguing for an essentialist approach here but rather for an epistemological one: there are specific conditions in which the colonizers might deviate from their position, give up their colonial position and privileges, and initiate an egalitarian dialogue. Knowledge of Arabic as one of the languages of the shared space would encourage or accelerate the process of decolonization.

Conclusion

Post-Zionism, critical sociology, postcolonialism, and the settler colonial paradigm constitute diverging yet intersecting approaches to the study of Palestine/Israel. The first three approaches originated in the settler colonial society itself. The fourth, conversely, was shaped by a unique position: on the margins of but also within the settler society. Within the current, renewed phase of the settler colonial paradigm in Israel, scholars ponder ways to incorporate indigenous theory into historical and sociological research in challenging the roots of the settler colonial project. The knowledge and power alliance is inescapable; the cross fertilization between an indigenous-led anticolonial theory and political praxis addressing the settler colonial paradigm can be an avenue toward redress.

However, the settler colonial paradigm is still in its infancy, and much more work remains to be done to establish and consolidate it. One of the justified criticisms that has been leveled against the paradigm lies in its focus on the theorization of settlers and their colonial practices, which in turn reproduces the marginalization of the indigenous and fixates on a binary of settler and native. Critics argue for a greater focus to be placed on indigenous studies, in order to shed light on the history of indigenous peoples, their experiences, their resistance, and their knowledge production, rather than on their elimination or on the "structure" itself. In this regard, Barakat, Warrior, Kauanui, and other indigenous scholars argue that settler colonialism as a structure alone does not provide a way to address the generations-long dynamic of

anticolonial survival and resistance. Each argues that settler colonial studies should not substitute for indigenous studies, as it has sometimes been taken up in North American scholarship.¹¹⁵

Another important criticism is that the institutionalization of the paradigm as a distinct subfield forecloses connections with other fields of study such as imperialism and social formations.¹¹⁶ The settler colonial paradigm should not come at the expense of indigenous/native studies, but rather should supplement such work by identifying settler practices and the apparatuses that allow settler colonialism to operate materially and culturally. In a similar vein, the academicization of the “question of Palestine,” without a coherent liberation project, risks presenting settler colonialism as a merely conceptual debate, that Palestine and Palestinians might become simply objects to think and theorize about. In the light of the decline of the political movements along with the fracture of Palestinian leadership in the 1967 Occupied Palestinian Territories, scholarship should be accompanied by—or itself produced as—a liberation praxis for *all* Palestinians.

While the settler colonial paradigm encompasses a variety of standpoints, the lifting up of indigenous lenses might particularly change the way we understand the case of Israel/Palestine and the perspectives of different actors. Palestinian scholarship might reshape the debate by redirecting critique to center on both subjectivities and structures. For the Palestinian citizens in Israel, Jewish Israelis are both consociates—those with whom they maintain shared spaces and interactions—and contemporaries: those more distant who are not encountered every day.¹¹⁷ Citizenship is a realm of shared political space, albeit asymmetrical. Palestinian citizens, therefore, have a particular “second sight,” enabled through their own “double consciousness,” deserving of epistemic privileging.¹¹⁸ It is through this second sight that Palestinians, and other indigenous subjects, approach scholarship. This is not a call for an entrenched identity politics, but rather a comment on what indigenous knowledge reveals—through not merely identity but also subject position. Subject position is relational and contingent, and the subjectivity, as in scholarship writ large, inflects knowledge production. It is through encounters with settler colonizers and the apparatus of the state that the Palestinians in Israel are situated to theorize settler colonialism critically and work toward its dismantling. Just as Du Bois derived a microanalysis of subjectivity and macroanalysis of colonialism and capitalism from his situatedness in those exact formations, so too do Palestinian scholars draw on their phenomenological relations and ontological presence as a point of departure. It is the circulation of knowledge between and among global intellectual communities that will consolidate the analysis of Israeli and Palestinian societies through the settler colonial paradigm.

It is too early to predict whether the settler colonial paradigm possesses the power to adequately challenge Zionist hegemony in the various fields of research. However, historical and political transformations in the Israeli-Palestinian context have made it difficult to continue to disregard or dismiss it. First, the rise of the paradigm and its incorporation into the Palestinian consciousness are linked to the transformation of the political relations between Palestinian citizens in Israel and the State of Israel. Second, the current academic landscape is different from that which prevailed during the era of

the post-Zionists/new historians, critical sociology, and postcolonial studies. Then, discussions about 1948, the Nakba, and the memory of expulsion were not part of a political project; today, the labor of Palestinian scholars and students in Israel, like the Palestinian collective political presence itself, is becoming more visible.

For now, the settler colonial paradigm is the work of a relatively small group of scholars, but their numbers are increasing rapidly, in part because it is becoming a project of collective study carried out in cooperation with international scholars, not the theoretical occupation of few isolated individuals. The arguments discussed in this article crucially could have come about only in this current political moment: they would not have been received as seriously in past decades. The “return of history,” a distinctly contingent occurrence, has allowed Palestinians to articulate their imbrication in settler colonial structures politically. Palestinians are in a relatively new position to decolonize knowledge, and that position reflects the research agenda, priorities, and reception. Despite the growing restrictions and political limitations placed on academic freedom in Israel, Palestinian and Israeli scholars continue to challenge the Zionist narrative.

One of the challenges facing these scholars is to counteract the localization and exceptionalism of the existing research on Palestine/Israel. This would require further explorations of (in)commensurabilities to other settler colonial cases and the generation of forms of knowledge relevant to other formations paired with indigenous studies. Palestine instantiates a crucible for different domains of oppression, domination, and resistance, as well as for the formation of national groups. Could the settler colonial paradigm illuminate the study of the colonized, similar to the work and influence of anticolonial intellectuals like Frantz Fanon, W.E.B. Du Bois, and Aimé Césaire, for example, wherein intellectual production has been used to challenge existing hegemonic paradigms and generate new theoretical modes of inquiry? What the settler colonial paradigm allows for is a recognition that despite the distinctiveness of settler colonial cases, each maintains trans-state and transhistorical linkages between the role of imperialism and colonialism in forming much of our global political structures.

It is the role of the (public) sociologist to identify commonalities and differences, to comprehend how destructive settler colonial governmentality operates, to draw commensurabilities transcending their colonized contexts, and to articulate collective struggles for liberation. A critical dialogue between social-political theory and the settler colonial paradigm could generate a new epistemological terrain, not only to break epistemic violence but to engender alternative paths and facilitate political venues for decolonization. Paired with indigenous theory, the settler colonial paradigm could form the basis of a different politics. This different politics is not a social justice-oriented project but one that shakes up settler privileges and innocence, assuages indigenous being, and seeks redress.¹¹⁹ The settler colonial paradigm could renew impetus for a project of emancipation for both Palestinians from their colonial existence and the Israelis from their colonial subjectivity and privileged positionality, recognizing incommensurabilities in how the latter have materially benefited. It is an *unsettling* approach to the core logics subtending the enduring colonization—material conditions, such as replacement and land dispossession, rather than merely ethnic, religious,

or national realms: that is, both an epistemological and a material project. I argue for the possibility for knowledge to transform material existences, recognizing the deep limitations of ideas to change material conditions. The settler colonial paradigm carries the possibility for theorizing what a future just society and decolonized infrastructure must entail.

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Notes

1. See, e.g., Edward Said, "Zionism from the Standpoint of Its Victims," *Social Text* 1 (1979): 7–58; Abdelwahab Elmessiri, *The Land of Promise: A Critique of Political Zionism* (New Brunswick, NJ: North American Books, 1977); Fayez Sayegh, *Zionist Colonialism in Palestine* (Beirut: Research Center, Palestine Liberation Organization, 1965); George Jabbour, *Settler Colonialism in Southern Africa and the Middle East* (Beirut: Palestine Liberation Organization Research Center, 1970); Rosemary Sayigh, *Palestinians: From Peasants to Revolutionaries; A People's History* (London: Zed Books, 1979); Ibrahim Abu-Lughod and Baha Abu-Laban, eds., *Settler Regimes in Africa and the Arab World: The Illusion of Endurance* (Wilmette, IL: Medina University Press International, 1974); Jamil Hilal, "Imperialism and Settler Colonialism in West Asia: Israel and the Arab Palestinian Struggle," *Utafiti: Journal of Arts & Social Studies & Social Sciences* 1, no. 1 (1976): 51–69; Maxime Rodinson, *Israel: A Colonial-Settler State* (New York: Monad Press, 1973). All but Rodinson are Palestinian or other Arab scholars.
2. The term "settler colonialism" was further developed by David Fieldhouse, *The Colonial Empires: A Comparative Survey from the Eighteenth Century* (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1966), and George M. Fredrickson, *White Supremacy: A Comparative Study of American and South African History* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1981), who applied it mainly to British settler colonies. It was not widely applied to Palestine/Israel by non-Arabs until Gershon Shafir, *Land, Labor and the Origins of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict, 1882–1914* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1989).
3. I employ the slash in "Palestine/Israel" in order to allude to and accentuate the multiple temporalities in the history of the territories whose borders were signified by the British Mandate but disrupted by settler colonial processes. This usage brings Palestine side by

side with Israel to depict a split geographical entity, reinstating the temporality of historic Palestine and restoring its elimination from the map and from consciousnesses.

4. E.g., Patrick Wolfe, *Settler Colonialism and the Transformation of Anthropology* (London: Cassell, 1999); Patrick Wolfe, "Settler Colonialism and the Elimination of the Native," *Journal of Genocide Research* 8, no. 4 (December 2006): 387–409, <http://doi.org/10.1080/14623520601056240>; Caroline Elkins and Susan Pedersen, "Introduction: Settler Colonialism; A Concept and Its Uses," in Caroline Elkins and Susan Pedersen, eds., *Settler Colonialism in the Twentieth Century* (New York: Routledge, 2005), 20–21; Lorenzo Veracini, *Settler Colonialism: A Theoretical Overview* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010).
5. My use here of the term "sociology in Israel" (as opposed to "Israeli sociology") is intended to describe a group of researchers in the settler colonial paradigm who are Palestinians and Jewish Israelis, have Israeli citizenship, and know Hebrew, yet do not necessarily define themselves as "Israeli" researchers. Most of them hold at least one academic degree from an Israeli university. Some live outside of Israel, whether in the 1967 Occupied Palestinian Territories or in academic institutions in North America and Europe. Some are located in research centers and universities in the Occupied West Bank. Most have maintained a connection with the Israeli academy or with Palestinian society within Israel.
6. Compare to the genealogy of the anthropology of Palestine by Khaled Furani and Dan Rabinowitz in "The Ethnographic Arriving of Palestine," *Annual Review of Anthropology* 40 (October 2011): 475–91.
7. See, e.g., Rashid Khalidi, *The Hundred's Year War on Palestine: A History of Settler Colonialism and Resistance, 1917–2017* (New York: Metropolitan Books, 2020); Lila Abu-Lughod, "Imagining Palestine's Alter-Natives: Settler Colonialism and Museum Politics," *Critical Inquiry* 47 (2002): 1–27; Omar Jabary Salamanca, Mezna Qato, Kareem Rabie, and Sobhi Samour, "Past Is Present: Settler Colonialism in Palestine," *Settler Colonial Studies* 2, no. 1 (2012): 1–8; Sherene Seikaly, *Men of Capital: Scarcity and Economy in Mandate Palestine* (Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University Press, 2015); Maya Mikdashi, "What Is Settler Colonialism? (for Leo Delano Ames Jr.)," *American Indian Culture & Research Journal* 37, no. 2 (2013): 23–34; Noura Erakat, *Justice for Some: Law and the Question of Palestine* (Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University Press, 2019); Mazen Masri, "Colonial Imprints: Settler-Colonialism as a Fundamental Feature of Israeli Constitutional Law," *International Journal of Law in Context* 13, no. 3 (2017): 388–407.
8. Some argue that the settler colonial paradigm first appeared during the second half of the sixteenth century. See Gabriel Piterberg, "The Zionist Colonization of Palestine in the Context of Comparative Settler Colonialism," in *Palestine and the Palestinians in the 21st Century*, ed. Rochelle Davis and Mimi Kirk (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2013), 15–34. Others find examples of settler colonialism in prehistoric societies. See Gadi Algazi, "Profits of Military Rule" (paper presented at the workshop "New Directions in Palestinian Studies: The Politics of Archives and the Practices of Memory," Brown University, March 2017).
9. Elkins and Pedersen, "Introduction: Settler Colonialism."
10. Veracini, *Settler Colonialism*.
11. David Lloyd, "Settler Colonialism and the State of Exception: The Example of Palestine/Israel," *Settler Colonial Studies* 2, no. 1 (2012): 59–80, esp. 66, <http://doi.org/10.1080/2201473X.2012.10648826>.

12. Wolfe, *Settler Colonialism*, 2. Previously different analytical categories were used to depict the practices of destruction or elimination used by the Zionist movement against the Palestinian society, space, and polity, such as “sociocide”: Abed-al-Jawad, “Sociocide: A New Concept to Explain the Zionist and Israeli Policy toward the Palestinian People” (unpublished manuscript); “spacio-cide”: Sari Hanafi, “Spacio-cide: Colonial Politics, Invisibility and Rezoning in Palestinian Territory,” *Contemporary Arab Affairs* 2, no. 1 (January 2009): 121–206, <http://doi.org/10.1080/17550910802622645>; “politicide”: Baruch Kimmerling, *Politicide: The Real Legacy of Ariel Sharon* (London: Verso, 2003); and “culturicide.” While each of these analytical categories can give account to one aspect of elimination, elimination as a structure or as a process (as I will argue later) in the settler colonial paradigm encompasses each of these categories to characterize the transformations that the indigenous society goes through in its entirety.
13. Quoted in Stephen Halbrook, “The Class Origins of Zionist Ideology,” *Journal of Palestine Studies* 2, no. 1 (1972): 86.
14. Allen Lori, “Subaltern Critique and the History of Palestine,” in Didier Fassin and Bernard E. Harcourt, eds., *A Time for Critique* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2019).
15. Sayegh, *Zionist Colonialism*, 2. Notably, the use of the settler colonial framework on the Israeli-Palestinian case occurred earlier than in some other cases. So although it is true that the settler colonial paradigm utilized to analyze parts of the Americas, Oceania, and Africa in more current intellectual history has constitutively influenced how scholars take up the question of Palestine, it can be argued that the case of Palestine was one of the early instances of the paradigm’s use in its previous form, even if it got little attention then. That Sayegh was the first to use the concept is substantiated in J. Kēhaulani Kauanui, “‘A Structure, Not an Event’: Settler Colonialism and Enduring Indigeneity,” *Lateral* 5, no. 1 (Spring 2016), <http://doi.org/10.25158/L5.1.7>. That the movement began using the terminology of national liberation in the 1970s is mentioned in Lori, “Subaltern Critique.”
16. Sayegh, *Zionist Colonialism*, 2.
17. Derek Penslar, “Is Zionism a Colonial Movement?,” in Derek Penslar, ed., *Israel in History: The Jewish State in Comparative Perspective* (London: Routledge, 2007), 90–111.
18. Elmessiri, *Land*; George Jabbour, *Settler Colonialism in Southern Africa and the Middle East* (Beirut: Palestine Liberation Organization Research Center, 1970). Unlike metropolitan centers, however, the donors and supporters of the Zionist movement outside Israel were not economically profiting from their “investments”—theirs was mainly a political-cultural sympathy, but although it differs from other settler colonial metropolises/international sponsors, the core issue is the support, without which it is difficult to imagine the movement’s succeeding.
19. Areej Sabbagh-Khoury, “Colonization Practices and Interactions in the Book: Hashomer Hatzair’s Kibbutz and the Surrounding Arab Villages on the Edge of the Jezreel Valley (Marge ibn Amer), 1936–1956” [in Hebrew] (PhD dissertation, Tel Aviv University, 2015).
20. I argue that militarization, the Zionist resort to forceful practices, and the development of transfer in Zionist thought in the 1930s were articulated through interactions with Palestinian and their resistance. See Anita Shapira, *Land and Power: The Zionist Resort to Force, 1881–1948* (Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University Press, 1999).
21. Sabbagh-Khoury, “Colonization Practices.”
22. Twenty percent of the cultivable land (i.e., not the Naqab).

23. Nadim N. Rouhana and Areej Sabbagh-Khoury, "Settler-Colonial Citizenship: Conceptualizing the Relationship between Israel and Its Palestinian Citizens," *Settler Colonial Studies* 5, no. 3 (October 2014): 205–25, <http://doi.org/10.1080/2201473X.2014.947671>; Shira Robinson, *Citizen Strangers: Palestinians and the Birth of Israel's Liberal Settler State* (Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University Press, 2013).
24. Rouhana and Sabbagh-Khoury, "Settler-Colonial Citizenship."
25. Turning the Israeli state into a mother state is one of the transformations the Zionist project underwent. But this does not mean that other "mother" states, especially the United States, have stopped supporting Israel and the Zionist project. I refer to other aspects of the transformation later in this article.
26. International Court of Justice, "Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestine Territory" (The Hague: International Court of Justice Reports, 2004), <https://www.icj-cij.org/en/case/131>.
27. With the exception of relatively marginal elites, they would not want to be associated with Arabs or with their Arab identity; indeed, the vast majority would see such association as further humiliation.
28. Elia Zureik, *The Palestinians in Israel: A Study in Internal Colonialism* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1979).
29. Elia Zureik, *Israel's Colonial Project in Palestine: Brutal Pursuit*, Routledge Studies on the Arab-Israeli Conflict (Abingdon: Routledge, 2015).
30. Abu-Lughod and Abu-Laban, *Settler Regimes*; Hilal, "Imperialism and Settler"; Sayegh, *Zionist Colonialism*.
31. Rodinson, *Israel*.
32. Elkins and Pedersen, "Introduction: Settler Colonialism"; Patrick Wolfe, "New Jews for Old: Racializing the Jewish State," in *Traces of History: Elementary Structures of Race* (London: Verso, 2016); Veracini, *Settler Colonialism*; Zachary Lockman, "Land, Labor and the Logic of Zionism: A Critical Engagement with Gershon Shafir," *Settler Colonial Studies* 2, no. 1 (2012): 38–39, <http://doi.org/10.1080/2201473X.2012.10648824>.
33. Uri Ram, "The colonization Perspective in Israeli Sociology: Internal and External Comparisons," *Journal of Historical Sociology* 6, no. 3 (September 1993): 327–50, <http://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-6443.1993.tb00052.x>.
34. The alliance of sociology was with the state and not with all the settlers, many of whom were conceived of as "human materials" for the Zionist project. The sociology of the era was not attentive to them or to their plight.
35. Sabbagh-Khoury, "Colonization Practices."
36. See, e.g., Avi Shlaim, "The Debate about 1948," in Ilan Pappé, ed., *The Palestine/Israel Question: A Reader* (New York: Routledge, 1999); Benny Morris, *The Birth of the Palestinian Refugee Problem, 1947–1949* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988); Simha Flapan, *The Birth of Israel: Myths and Realities* (New York: Pantheon, 1987).
37. The Israeli identity of these researchers affected the reception of their arguments in the West. Some would argue—not entirely mistakenly—that their research methodologies and almost exclusive reliance on the Israeli and British archives and other national records increased their credibility. However, works by Palestinian historians and sociologists—who often relied on the same archives, wrote on related topics, and reached similar conclusions—did not find the same reception. See, e.g., the work of Nur-eldeen Masalha, *Expulsion of the Palestinians: The Concept of "Transfer" in Zionist Political Thought, 1882–1948* (Washington, DC: Institute for Palestine Studies, 1992); Nur-eldeen Masalha,

- A Land Without a People: Israel, Transfer and the Palestinians, 1948–1996* (London: Clays, 1997). This disparity disregards the fact that many of the Palestinian researchers, including those from the first post-Nakba generation, knew the past either through their own direct experiences and pain or through their families. In addition to their excavations of the British and Arab state archives they used oral history methods to excavate further and essential knowledge. See Nafez Nazzari, *The Palestinian Exodus from Galilee, 1948* (Beirut: Institute for Palestine Studies, 1978); Sayigh, *Palestinians: From Peasants to Revolutionaries*. Meanwhile, scholars in the West in this period generally remained oblivious to the settler colonial nature of Israel, despite the efforts of indigenous scholars, including those who published in English.
38. Yehouda Shenhar, *Beyond the Two States Solution: A Jewish Political Essay* [in Hebrew] (Tel Aviv: Am-Oved, 2010).
 39. Ilan Pappé, “Revisiting 1967: The False Paradigm of Peace, Partition and Parity,” *Settler Colonial Studies* 3, no. 4 (2013): 341–51, <http://doi.org/10.1080/2201473X.2013.810699>; Gadi Algazi, “The Refugee Issue: Between the Nakba of 1948 and the 1967 War,” *Journal of Palestinian Studies* 113 (2018): 90–106.
 40. See, e.g., Uri Ram, *Israeli Nationalism: Social Conflicts and the Politics of Knowledge* (London: Routledge, 2011); Neve Gordon and Moriel Ram, “Ethnic Cleansing and the Formation of Settler Colonial Geographies,” *Political Geography* 53 (2016): 20–29, <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.polgeo.2016.01.01>; Arnon Yehuda Degani, “The Decline and Fall of the Israeli Military Government, 1948–1966: A Case of Settler-Colonial Consolidation?,” *Settler Colonial Studies* 5, no. 1 (2015): 84–99.
 41. See, e.g., Algazi, “Refugee Issue”; Ahmad Amara, Alexander Kedar, and Oren Yiftachel, *Emptied Lands: A Legal Geography of Bedouin Rights in the Negev* (Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University Press, 2018); Eyal Weizman and Fazal Sheikh Fazal, *The Conflict Shoreline: Colonialism as Climate Change* (Göttingen: Steidl, 2015); Ilan Pappé, “Zionism as Colonialism: A Comparative View of Diluted Colonialism in Asia and Africa,” *South Atlantic Quarterly* 107, no. 4 (October 2008): 611–33, <http://doi.org/10.1215/00382876-2008-009>; Marcelo Svirsky and Ronen Ben-Arie, *From Shared Life to Co-resistance in Historic Palestine* (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield International, 2017); Naama Blatman-Thomas, “Commuting for Rights: Circular Mobilities and Regional Identities of Palestinians in a Jewish-Israeli Town,” *Geoforum* 78 (January 2017): 22–32, <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geoforum.2016.11.007>; Oren Yiftachel, “The Palestinians in Israel: Majority-Minority Relations and the Colonial Momentum” [in Hebrew], *State & Society* 7, no. 1 (2010): 141–58; Robinson, *Citizen Strangers*; Ronit Lentin, *Traces of Racial Exception: Racializing Israeli Settler Colonialism* (London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2018); Piterberg, “Zionist.”
 42. Critical trends in institutional sociology in Israel were termed “critical sociology.” Those in history were grouped as new historians or post-Zionists. Uri Ram, *The Changing Agenda of Israeli Sociology* (Albany: SUNY Series in Israeli Studies, 1995).
 43. Avishai Ehrlich, “The Crisis in Israel, Danger of Fascism?” *Khamsin*, no. 5 (July 10, 1978), <http://www.matzpen.org/english/1978-07-10/the-crisis-in-israel-danger-of-fascism-avishai-ehlich/>; Baruch Kimmerling, *Zionism and Territory: The Socio-territorial Dimension of Zionist Politics* (Berkeley: University of California, Berkeley, Institute of International Studies, 1983).
 44. Baruch Kimmerling and Joel S. Migdal, *Palestinians: The Making of a People* [in Hebrew] (Jerusalem: Keter, 1999).
 45. Shafir, *Land, Labor*.

46. It is worth mentioning that this book had little impact in Israel, as opposed to the book Shafir coauthored with Yoav Peled that did not explicitly use the *settler* colonial framework and that was very influential. See Gershon Shafir and Yoav Peled, *Being Israeli: The Dynamics of Multiple Citizenship* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002).
47. Ram, "Colonization Perspective"; Ram, *Changing Agenda*.
48. Daiva Stasiulis and Nira Yuval-Davis, "Introduction: Beyond Dichotomies—Gender, Race, Ethnicity and Class in Settler Colonial Societies," in Daiva Stasiulis and Nira Yuval-Davis, eds., *Unsettling Settler Societies: Articulations of Gender, Ethnicity, Race and Class* (London: Sage, 1995).
49. Nahla Abdo, "Women and Economic Citizenship," in *Women in Israel: Race, Gender and Citizenship* (London: Zed Books, 2011).
50. Benny Morris, e.g., wrote about Palestinians without knowing Arabic. A recent survey found that 6.2 percent of Israeli Jews can read an Arabic newspaper and fewer than 1 percent of Jews read literature in Arabic. See Yehouda Shenhav, Maisalon Dallashi, Rami Avnimelech, Nissim Mizrahi, and Yonatan Mendel, *Command of Arabic among Israeli Jews* [in Hebrew] (Jerusalem and Tel Aviv: Van Leer Jerusalem Institute and Tel Aviv University, 2015), 3. As will be noted later, scholarship conducted within the current wave of the settler colonial paradigm, by contrast, is distinguished by the reliance of researchers on the combined resources and languages of Palestinian and Israeli scholarship.
51. Ruth Gavison, "A Jewish and Democratic State: Challenges and Risks," in Menachem Mautner, Avi Sagi, and Ronen Shamir, eds., *Multiculturalism in a Democratic and Jewish State* [in Hebrew] (Tel Aviv: Ramot—Tel Aviv University, 1998); Asad Ghanem, Nadim N. Rouhana, and Oren Yiftachel, "Questioning 'Ethnic Democracy': A Response to Sammy Smooha," *Israel Studies* 3, no. 2 (1998): 253–67, www.jstor.org/stable/30245721; Amal Jamal, "Beyond 'Ethnic Democracy': State Structure, Multi-cultural Conflict and Differentiated Citizenship," *New Political Science* 24, no. 3 (2002): 411–31, <https://doi.org/10.1080/0739314022000005437>.
52. Sammy Smooha, "The Status Quo Option: Israel as an Ethnic Democracy—a Jewish-Democratic State" [in Hebrew], in Sarah Ozacky-Lazar, Asad Ghanem, and Ilan Pappé, eds., *7 Ways—Theoretical Options for the Status of Arabs in Israel* [in Hebrew] (Givat Haifa: Givat Haviva Institute for Peace, 1999).
53. Oren Yiftachel, "Ethnocracy, Democracy and Geography" [in Hebrew], *Alpayim* 19 (2000): 105–78; Ghanem, Rouhana, and Yiftachel, "Questioning 'Ethnic Democracy.'"
54. Amnon Raz-Krakotzkin, "A Jewish and Democratic State: Six Perspectives" [in Hebrew], in *New Jewish Time: Jewish Culture in a Secular Age—an Encyclopedic View* [in Hebrew], 4th ed. (Jerusalem: Keter & Lamda; New Jewish Time, 2007).
55. Azmi Bishara, "On the Question of the Palestinian Minority in Israel" [in Hebrew], *Theory & Criticism* 3 (Winter 1993): 7–20.
56. Hebrew: Azami Bishara, "One Hundred Years of Zionism," *Theory and Criticism*, nos. 12–13 (1999): 507–28. Arabic: Azami Bishara, "One Hundred Years of Zionism, from the Dialectic of Existence to the Dialectic of Substance," *al-Carmel Journal* (1997), 11–20.
57. See Nahla Abdo, "Racism, Zionism and the Palestinian Working Class, 1920–1947," *Studies in Political Economy* 37, no. 1 (1992): 59–92 (drawing from her 1989 dissertation); Nahla Abdo and Nira Yuval-Davis, "Palestine, Israel, and the Zionist Settler Project," in Daiva Stasiulis and Nira Yuval-Davis, eds., *Unsettling Settler Societies: Articulations of Gender, Race, Ethnicity and Class* (London: Sage, 1995).
58. Abdo, "Racism, Zionism," 60.
59. See Patricia Hill Collins, "Learning from the Outsider Within: The Sociological Significance of Black Feminist Thought," in Mary M. Fonow and Judith A. Cook, eds.,

- Beyond Methodology: Feminist Research as Lived Research* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1991); Linda Tuhiwai Smith, *Decolonizing Methodologies: Research and Indigenous Peoples* (London: Zed Books, 1999).
60. George Steinmetz, "Sociology and Sisyphus: Postcolonialism, Anti-positivism, and Modernist Narrative in Patterson's Oeuvre," *Theory & Society* 48 (2019): 799–822.
 61. Hannan Hever and Adi Ophir, "Homi K. Bhabha: Walking the Tightrope" [in Hebrew], *Theory & Criticism* 5 (Autumn 1994): 141–43; Yehouda Shenhav, *Coloniality and the Postcolonial Condition* [in Hebrew] (Jerusalem: Van Leer Jerusalem Institute & Kibbutz Meuhad, 2004).
 62. Edward Said, *Orientalism*, trans. Atalyah Zilber [in Hebrew] (Tel Aviv: Am Oved, 2000); Edward Said, *The Question of Palestine* (New York: Vintage Books, 1979); Edward Said, "Zionism from the Standpoint of Its Victims," *Social Text*, no. 1. (Winter 1979): 7–58; see also Ella Shohat, "The Postcolonial in Translation: Reading Said in Hebrew," *Journal of Palestine Studies* 33, no. 3 (2004): 55–75, <http://doi.org/10.1525/jps.2004.33.3.055>.
 63. Frantz Fanon, *Black Skin, White Masks*, trans. Tamar Kaplansky (Tel Aviv: Maariv, 2004); Frantz Fanon, *The Wretched of the Earth*, trans. Orit Rozen (Tel Aviv: Babel, 2006); see also Yehouda Shenhav, "Sovereignty Gaps, the Exception and State of Exception" [in Hebrew], *Theory & Criticism* 29 (Autumn 2006): 205–18.
 64. Lev Luis Grinberg, "Speechlessness: In Search of Language to Resist the Israeli 'Thing Without a Name,'" *International Journal of Politics, Culture, & Society* 22, no. 1 (March 2009): 105–16, <http://doi.org/10.1007/s10767-009-9043-2>.
 65. Uri Ram, *Israeli Nationalism: Social Conflicts and the Politics of Knowledge* (London: Routledge, 2011).
 66. Yali Hashash, "We're All Jews: On 'White Trash,' Mizrahim, and Intersectionality within the Hegemony" [in Hebrew], *Theory & Criticism* 48 (Summer 2017): 249–64.
 67. Smadar Sharon, *How to Occupy a Homeland: The Planning and Settlement of Hevel Lakhish in the 1950s* (Haifa: Pardes, 2018).
 68. This may also account for the reluctance of some Palestinian researchers to use the term "indigenous." The problem implied by the English term does not exist in Hebrew or Arabic (*al-sukkān al-aşīyyīn*, in its literal translation, "the original inhabitants").
 69. Scott McLeod, "An Interview with Yasser Arafat," *New York Review of Books* (June 1987), <https://www.nybooks.com/articles/1987/06/11/an-interview-with-yasser-arafat/>.
 70. Jamil Hilal, "The Secret of the Intractability of the Palestinian State," *Journal of Palestinian Issues* (2016): 262–63, <http://www.shuun.ps/page-765-ar.html>.
 71. Nadim N. Rouhana and Areej Sabbagh-Khoury, "Memory and the Return of History in a Settler-Colonial Context," in Nadim N. Rouhana, ed., *Israel and Its Palestinian Citizens: Ethnic Privileges in the Jewish State* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017).
 72. Namely, Adalah, *Future Vision of the Palestinian Arabs in Israel* (Nazareth: National Committee for the Heads of the Arab Local Authorities); *The Haifa Declaration* by Mada-al-Carmel: Arab Center for Applied Social Research (Haifa: May 15, 2007); and Yousef T. Jabareen, *An Equal Constitution for All* (Haifa: Mossawa–Advocacy Center for Arab Citizens in Israel, 2007), [http://www.mossawa.org/eng/Public/file/02007%20An%20Equal%20Constitution%20For%20All%20\(1\).pdf](http://www.mossawa.org/eng/Public/file/02007%20An%20Equal%20Constitution%20For%20All%20(1).pdf).
 73. Before this, familiarity and knowledge helped Palestinian researchers from Israel, such as Sabri al-Jiris, become key figures in the Research Center of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), established in Beirut in 1965.
 74. See, e.g., Ahmad Amara, Alexander Kedar, and Oren Yiftachel, *Emptied Lands: A Legal Geography of Bedouin Rights in the Negev* (Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University Press, 2018); Ahmed H. Sa'di, "Colonialism and Surveillance," in Kirstie Ball, Kevin

- Haggerty, and David Lyon, eds., *Routledge Handbook of Surveillance Studies* (London: Routledge, 2012), 151–58; Honaïda Ghanim, “From Kubaneyia to Outpost: A Genealogy of the Palestinian Conceptualization of Jewish Colonialism” [in Hebrew], *Theory & Criticism* 47 (Winter 2016): 15–39; Ismael Abu-Saad, “Spatial Transformation and Indigenous Resistance: The Urbanization of the Palestinian Bedouin in Southern Israel,” *American Behavioral Scientist* 51, no. 12 (August 2008): 1713–54, <https://doi.org/10.1177/0002764208318928>; Jamal, “Beyond ‘Ethnic Democracy’”; Lana Tatour, “The Culturalisation of Indigeneity: The Palestinian-Bedouin of the Naqab and Indigenous Rights,” *International Journal of Human Rights* 23, no. 10 (April 2019): 1569–93, <http://doi.org/10.1080/13642987.2019.1609454>; Magid Shihade, “Settler Colonialism and Conflict: The Israeli State and Its Palestinian Subjects,” *Settler Colonial Studies* 2, no. 1 (2012): 108–23, <http://doi.org/10.1080/2201473X.2012.10648828>; Mansour Nasasra, “The Ongoing Judaization of the Naqab and the Struggle for Recognizing the Indigenous Rights of the Arab Bedouin People,” *Settler Colonial Studies* 2, no. 1 (2012): 81–107, <http://doi.org/10.1080/2201473X.2012.10648827>; Mustafa Mohanad and Asad Ghanem, “Palestinians in Israel between the State and the Homeland: A Survey of the Development of the Research Agenda” [in Hebrew], *Megamot* 51, no. 2 (April 2017): 143–64; Sabbagh-Khoury, “Colonization Practices”; Nadera Shalhoub-Kevorkian, “Human Suffering in Colonial Contexts: Reflections from Palestine,” *Settler Colonial Studies* 4, no. 3 (January 2014): 277–90, <http://doi.org/10.1080/2201473X.2013.859979>; Raef Zreik, “When Does a Settler Become a Native? (With Apologies to Mamdani),” *Constellations* 23, no. 3 (September 2016): 351–64; Rouhana and Sabbagh-Khoury, “Settler-Colonial Citizenship”; Sarab Abu-Rabia-Queeder, “The Biopolitics of Declassing Palestinian Professional Women in a Settler-Colonial Context,” *Current Sociology* 67, no. 1 (January 2019): 141–58, <https://doi.org/10.1177/0011392117742432>; Rouhana and Sabbagh-Khoury, “Memory and the Return of History.”
75. Led by the Palestinian scholar Nadim Rouhana.
 76. Raef Zreik, building on a four-lecture series titled “From Settlers to Natives,” published an article presenting central political and theoretical issues pertaining to the role of the native (if indeed there is such a role) in questioning the status of the settler and offering solutions to the conflict, despite being a victim. Zreik, “When Does a Settler Become a Native?”
 77. Noam Hofstadter, *Point of Access: Barriers for Public Access to Israeli Government Archives* [in Hebrew] (Tel Aviv: Akevot Institute for Israeli-Palestinian Conflict Research, 2016).
 78. Audra Simpson, *Mohawk Interruptus: Political Life across the Borders of Settler States* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2014); Kauanui, “‘A Structure, Not an Event’”; Mahmood Mamdani, “Settler Colonialism: Then and Now,” *Critical Inquiry* 41, no. 3 (March 2015): 596–614, <http://doi.org/10.1086/680088>; Glen S. Coulthard, *Red Skin, White Masks: Reflecting the Colonial Politics of Recognition* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2014).
 79. Although entirely laudatory for its scholarly contributions, Ian Lustick’s *Paradigm Lost: From Two State Solution to One State Reality* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2019) has so far caught much scholarly acclaim, while similar Palestinian arguments about the failure of the two-state solution and the one-state reality have not captured the same attention.
 80. Edward Said, “Permission to Narrate,” *Journal of Palestine Studies* 13, no. 4 (1984): 27–48.

81. Even when the settler colonial paradigm was used to analyze the occupation of 1967, it was absent from the analysis of the practices developed by the State of Israel to manage the Palestinian population in Israel. For example, one of the paradigm's influential thinkers, Lorenzo Veracini (see Lorenzo Veracini, "The Other Shift: Settler Colonialism, Israel and the Occupation," *Journal of Palestine Studies* 42, no. 2 [Winter 2013]: 25–42, <http://doi.org/10.1525/jps.2013.42.2.26>), described the colonial project within the border of 1967 as a "successful" and normalized project that completed its realization (in the sense that the settlers were no longer defined as such). This analysis ignores the fact that the Israeli state treats the Naqab as a frontier area that should be occupied and disregards the refusal of Palestinian citizens to accept the definition of the state as a Jewish state in their demand for decolonization.
82. Sabbagh-Khoury, "Colonization Practices."
83. Gadi Algazi, "Settler Colonialism: Some Problems" (paper presented at Mada al-Carmel's workshop on Settler Colonialism and Zionism, Ramallah, December 2015).
84. Sabbagh-Khoury, "Colonization Practices."
85. Kauanui, "'A Structure, Not an Event.'"
86. Wolfe, "New Jews."
87. Rashid Khalidi, *Palestinian Identity: The Construction of Modern National Consciousness* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1997).
88. Some Palestinians in Israel claim sovereignty over historic Palestine in the framework of one secular state.
89. Researchers attribute the nonelimination of the indigenous Palestinian population to the relatively late period in which the Zionist project was launched and implemented, following the adoption of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide by the UN General Assembly (1948). Moreover, it could be argued that the entry of the Arab militaries into the conflict in 1948, as well as Palestine's location in the heart of the Arab world, played an important role in shaping the course of events.
90. An exception is the case of enslaved Africans in Brazil who were subjected to genocide in the colony before becoming the Afro-Brazilian nonsettler immigrants to the colony. They were brought by the Portuguese to work in the Brazilian colonial economy to replace the native Brazilian workers. See Wolfe, "New Jews." In this context, Yiftachel terms the colonialism that developed in Israel until the 1940s a "colonialism of refugees." Yiftachel, "Palestinians."
91. Elkins and Pedersen, "Introduction: Settler Colonialism," 3.
92. Shenhav et al., *Command of Arabic*.
93. Veracini, *Settler Colonialism*, 61–63.
94. Abdul-Wahab Kayyali, "Zionism and Imperialism: The Historical Origins," *Journal of Palestine Studies* 6, no. 3 (1977): 98–112, <http://doi.org/10.2307/2535582>.
95. William Gallois, "The Destruction of the Islamic State of Being, Its Replacement in the Being of the State: Algeria, 1830–1847," *Settler Colonial Studies* 8, no. 2 (January 2017): 131–51, <https://doi.org/10.1080/2201473X.2016.1273864>.
96. Honaida Ghanim and Azar Dakwar, *Israel and the Apartheid: A Comparative Study* (Ramallah: MADAR, Palestinian Forum for Israeli Studies, 2018); Ilan Pappé, *Israel and South Africa: The Many Faces of Apartheid* (London: Zed Books, 2015); Leila Farsakh, "Independence, Cantons, or Bantustans: Whither the Palestinian State?," *Middle East Journal* 59, no. 2 (2005): 230–45, <https://doi.org/10.3751/59.2.13>; Raef Zreik, "Palestine, Apartheid, and the Rights Discourse," *Journal of Palestine Studies* 34, no. 1 (Autumn 2004): 68–80, <http://doi.org/10.1525/jps.2004.34.1.68>. Clarno's work is among the

- exceptions, as he incorporates settler colonialism and capitalism in a comparison between Israel/Palestine and South Africa. See Andy Clarno, *Neoliberal Apartheid: Palestine/Israel and South Africa after 1994* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2017).
97. Daphna Golan-Agnon, "Between Human Rights and Hope—What Israelis Might Learn from the Truth and Reconciliation Process in South Africa," *International Review of Victimology* 17, no. 1 (2010): 31–48, <https://doi.org/10.1177/026975801001700103>.
 98. Dan Greenstein, *Genealogies of Conflict: Class, Identity, and State in Palestine/Israel and South Africa* (Hanover, NH: University Press of New England, for Wesleyan University Press, 1995); Mona Younis, *Liberation and Democratization: The South African and Palestinian National Movements* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2000). Notably, Greenstein's formidable work on apartheid has not been widely received (i.e., translated, disseminated) in sociology in Israel. Perhaps the reasons for this occlusion include Greenstein's theorizing of contemporary Israel/Palestine by way of apartheid, a paradigm that challenges Israeli hegemony.
 99. See "What Is BDS?," BDS (Boycott, Divestment, Sanctions), <https://bdsmovement.net/what-is-bds>.
 100. Clarno, *Neoliberal Apartheid*, 200.
 101. While the works of Michel Foucault are noteworthy and foundational in this regard, he himself does not discuss colonialism in this way.
 102. Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, "The German Ideology," in Robert C. Tucker, ed., *The Marx-Engels Reader*, 2nd rev. ed. (New York: Norton, 1978), 172.
 103. Louis Althusser, "Philosophy as a Revolutionary Weapon," *New Left Review* 64 (1970), <https://newleftreview.org/issues/164/articles/louis-althusser-philosophy-as-a-revolutionary-weapon>.
 104. Ibid.
 105. Yara Hawari, Sharri Plonski, and Elian Weizman, "Seeing Israel through Palestine: Knowledge Production as Anti-colonial Praxis," *Settler Colonial Studies* 9, no. 1 (2019): 155–75, <https://doi.org/10.1080/2201473X.2018.1487129>.
 106. Antonio Gramsci, *Selections from the Prison Notebooks*, trans. and ed. Quintin Hoare and Geoffrey Nowell Smith (New York: International Publishers, 1989), 134–47; Edward Said, *Representations of the Intellectual: The 1993 Reith Lectures* (New York: Vintage Books, 1994), 23.
 107. See, e.g., Gayle Rubin, "The Traffic in Women: Notes on the 'Political Economy' of Sex," in Rayna R. Reiter, ed., *Toward an Anthropology of Women* (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1975), 157–210.
 108. See, e.g., Combahee River Collective, "The Combahee River Collective Statement," in Keeanga-Yamahatta Taylor, ed., *How We Get Free: Black Feminism and the Combahee River Collective* (Chicago: Haymarket Books, 2012), 15–27.
 109. Sveva Magaraggia and Raewyn Connell, "Gender in Theory and Practice: An Interview with Raewyn Connell," *Feminist Review* 102 (2012): 116–24.
 110. Yasir Suleiman, *Being Palestinian: Personal Reflections on Palestinian Identity in the Diaspora* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2016).
 111. Asad Ghanem, "A Binational, Palestinian-Israeli State in All of Israel's/Palestine's Territory and the Place of Arab-Israeli Citizens within This System" [in Hebrew], in Ozacky-Lazar, Ghanem, and Pappé, eds., *7 Ways*; Nadim N. Rouhana, "The Option of a Binational State" [in Hebrew], in Ozacky-Lazar, Ghanem, and Pappé, eds., *7 Ways*.
 112. Zreik, "When Does a Settler Become a Native?"; Nadim N. Rouhana, "Decolonization as Reconciliation: Rethinking the National Conflict Paradigm in the Israeli-Palestinian

- Conflict,” *Ethnic & Racial Studies* 41, no. 4 (2018): 643–62, <http://doi.org/10.1080/01419870.2017.1324999>; Bashir, “Bi-national State in Israel/ Palestine: A Moral and Practical Solution,” [in Arabic], in Hani Masri, ed., *3rd Annual Conference: Towards a Palestinian Strategy Capable of Realizing the Palestinian National Aims* (Ramallah: Badal Palestinian Centre for Media and Research, 2009), 132–38. Interactions with Jewish Israeli colleagues who seek to promote discussion of the political rights of the Jews in Palestine within the framework of decolonization and binationalism strengthen these trends. See Amnon Raz-Krakotzkin, “Separation and Bi-nationalism,” *Jadal* 10 (June 2011), <http://mada-research.org/en/files/2011/06/jadal10/eng/amnon-raz-jadal10-eng.pdf>; Shenhav, *Beyond the Two States Solution*.
113. Despite the different positionalities inside this group. The Palestinian Bedouins in the south, e.g., are suffering from an ongoing spatial violence in living under the threat of displacement in order for the Israeli state to control the land they live on and to settle Jewish Israelis.
 114. The “Haifa Declaration” from 2007, e.g., states, “We formulate our position concerning the conditions for a historic reconciliation and the future that we hope for concerning the relations between the Jewish Israeli people and the Palestinian people. . . . This historic reconciliation requires us, the Arab Palestinians, to recognize the right of the Israeli Jewish people to self-determination and to life in peace, dignity, and security with the Palestinian and the other peoples of the region.” See <http://mada-research.org/en/files/2007/09/haifaenglish.pdf>. Criticism from Palestinians living under occupation was voiced at the third annual conference held by Masarat–Palestinian Center for Policy Research and Strategic Studies in Ramallah in 2014. Rouhana presented a paper titled “The Palestinian National Project: Towards the Return to a Settler Colonialism Framework” [in Arabic], https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=tgXB_im1Mvw. Both Rouhana and Zreik, who responded to his paper, discussed the importance of acknowledging Jewish collective rights as a vital and significant component of the articulation of the Palestinian national project. It is worth mentioning that this atmosphere has been changing in the last few years, with more Palestinians (in the 1967 Occupied Palestinian Territories and the Diaspora) acknowledging the importance of contemplating the Jewish Israeli existence in new frames of decolonization.
 115. Kauanui, “‘A Structure, Not an Event’”; Rana Barakat, “Writing/Righting Palestine Studies: Settler Colonialism, Indigenous Sovereignty and Resisting the Ghost(s) of History,” *Settler Colonial Studies* 8, no. 3 (March 2017): 1–15. <https://doi.org/10.1080/201473X.2017.1300048>; Robert Warrior, “Settler Colonial Studies and Native American and Indigenous Studies: A Position Paper” (presented at the 2015 ASA Annual Conference, San Diego, California, October 2015).
 116. Manu Vimalassery, Juliana Hu Pegues, and Alyosha Goldstein, “Introduction: On Colonial Unknowing,” *Theory & Event* 19, no. 4 (2016).
 117. Alfred Schutz, *Phenomenology of the Social World* (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1967); Jose Itzigsohn and Karida Brown, *The Sociology of W.E.B. Du Bois: Racialized Modernity and the Global Color Line* (New York: NYU Press, 2020).
 118. W.E.B. Du Bois, *The Souls of Black Folk* (New York: Dover, 1994); Chandra Talpade Mohanty, “Transnational Feminist Crossings: On Neoliberalism and Radical Critique,” *Signs* 38, no. 4 (2013): 967–91, <https://doi.org/10.1086/669576>.
 119. Eve Tuck and K. Wayne Yang, “Decolonization Is Not a Metaphor,” *Decolonization: Indigeneity, Education & Society* 1, no. 1 (2012): 1–40.

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