

JERUSALEMITES AND THE ISSUE OF CITIZENSHIP IN THE CONTEXT OF ISRAELI SETTLER-COLONIALISM

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ABSTRACT

This article aims to unmask the relationship between the Zionist settler-colonial project and its policies towards the citizenship of the indigenous Palestinian population of East Jerusalem. The article analyses Zionist citizenship politics in detail and how they play together the role of destroying the three (legal, national belonging, and societal membership) dimensions of citizenship for the Palestinians in East Jerusalem. I argue that settler-colonialism presents a more accurate typology for the analysis of the situation in Jerusalem in comparison to the other typologies of equality, occupation, neocolonialism, ethnocracy and open ethnocracy.

KEYWORDS: Settler-colonialism, ethnocracy, Jerusalem, Palestine, citizenship politics, deterritorialisation, elimination, dispossession, Judaisation, Israelisation, indigenous rights

The Settler-Colonial Project in Palestine and East Jerusalem: Settler-Colonial Models and Palestine

For an article about citizenship in a settler-colonial context, it is worthy to start with a brief overview of settler-colonialism and its models worldwide. Settler-colonialism is the 'transfer'/ethnic cleansing of the indigenous population from its own country. As such it creates an intra-border conflict with the indigenous population. This conflict is multifaceted,

primarily being about land and territory ownership, about past and present history, and about the future. Usually, all to be covered by ideological argumentations that justifies the cultural superiority of the 'civilised settler' over the 'primitive native' (see for instance, Wolfe (2006: 387–409).

The history of settler-colonialism worldwide shows that the settler-colonial as project might end up victorious by committing genocide against the indigenous population, like in the case of the United States. In another model from Algeria and Zimbabwe, the settler-colonial project ends by the expulsion of the colonial settlers. The third model takes place with the integration of the colonial settlers in the new society, as in the cases of South Africa and Northern Ireland. The *Settler-Colonial Studies* journal published by Taylor and Francis since 2011 and the writings of Patrick Wolfe and many other scholars have researched these models extensively.

The case of Palestine represents a fourth category of settler-colonialism that are combined with the 'transfer'/ethnic cleansing of the majority of the indigenous population as occurred in 1948 (followed by another partial 'transfer' in 1967). The common characteristic of all these four cases is that they represent a 'structure and not just an event' as Patrick Wolfe maintains (Wolfe 2006: 387). However, the case of Palestine with the Zionist settler project is different in the sense that it is still going on. Besides, the indigenous population is still struggling for its rights. The closest example to Palestine might be the Irish one where the Irish fought against settler-colonialism spanned for over more than eight hundred years starting from the twelfth century until the signing of the 'Great Friday Agreement' in 1998. On the other hand, the difference from Northern Ireland is the significant process of 'population transfer' outside the country that Palestine faced. During the process the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO) changed its objective, which might also have played a role in prolonging the process towards the Palestinian liberation.

In 1988, The PLO adopted the option for self-determination in a separate state of Palestine according to the 1967 borders. Its previous proposals looked alternatively to achieving a one-state solution. One version of such a state took the form of the secular democratic state as presented by Fateh. The Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) introduced another kind of the Socialist Democratic state, while a third form of the bi-national state was presented by Nayef Hawatmeh, the General Secretary of the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP) in 1968 (Abdul Hadi 1992).

Today, the one-state solution is back to the debate due to the impasse of achieving the two-state solution, examples of which are the call to a bi-national state by the Israeli left-wing intellectual A. B. Yehoshua (2015), or a state for all its citizens (Bishara 2003 and 2005 for instance), or the

call for a state for all its citizens and absentees (Masalha 1993). In between the one-state and the two-state solutions, there are ideas for two states with some openness between them such as the 'Two States with Open Borders' proposal (LeVine and Mossberg 2014), or the Federation (www.PA-il.org) or Confederation (www.ipconfederation.org) models. These proposals show plenty of solutions are available. The question is: why did the Israeli settler-colonial project reject all proposals and remain an exclusive project that leaves no space for a compromise of sharing the land with the indigenous population?

Palestine and the East Jerusalem Case

In the early years of the 1967 occupation, the Israeli Mapai-led Government annexed East Jerusalem to Israel, while deciding to call the West Bank and Gaza Strip as 'areas administered by Israel'. During those early years of occupation, the Minister Yigal Alon and others called for the annexation of the Gaza Strip to Israel and started the creation of settlements in the West Bank such as Gush Etzion in the North of West Bank (Pappe 2012). By 1977, a change to this policy took place with the formation of the Likud Government in that year led by Menahem Begin. In 1979, the Israeli High Court decided to give legitimacy to the first Israeli settlement in the West Bank called Elon Moreh that was established during the period of the former Mapai government. This legitimisation led to a tremendous increase of settlement expansion in the West Bank, causing the number of the settlers to go up to 91000 by 1991 (Jubeh 2012: 59). Since the peace process started by holding the Madrid Conference at the end of October that year. until today the number of settlers in the West Bank and East Jerusalem jumped to 627,000, according to Israeli sources (Peace Now and B'tselem websites), while the Israeli settlers were only evacuated from the Gaza Strip and Jenin area by 2005.

This brief overview shows that the 'peace process' for the Israeli Governments did not exceed being a public-relations play, that was mainly created as coverage for the continuation of the settler-colonial project. The number of settlers grew by around seven times during the 25 years of the peace process since the Madrid conference in 1991. On the other hand, the colonial settlement increase led to the presence of two populations in the same territory; the emerging settler-colonial presence since 1967 versus the indigenous population. This is the same as the case before 1948 leading to the 'transfer' of the Palestinians that year by force. This 'transfer' was repeated in 1967 by the Israeli Army (details presented by Masalha 2003: 177–213). The question, then, is there currently a preparation for a third 'transfer' to be added to the 1948 and 1967 ones,

and to be implemented during any upcoming war or severe crisis with the Palestinians.

History so far tells us that the Zionists transferred the majority of the Palestinians in 1948, and a fewer number of the West Bank and Gaza Strip Palestinians in 1967. In both cases, a transfer took place, while the rest of the Palestinians were put under a strict military rule that works in the service of the colonial settlers, and therefore subject to the confiscation of their lands and houses and other oppression and suppression procedures. These two examples point to a policy that includes two components; the first is the dispossession and ethnic cleansing (*nishul* according to Halper 2002 and 2008) of a part of the Palestinians, and the second is keeping the other part under an apartheid system.

After 1967, this bi-dimensional policy was practiced fully in East Jerusalem. For example, Israeli buses were placed in Damascus Gate after the 1967 war to transport the Palestinians to the Jordan River on their way to Jordan (Masalha 2003: 201). An additional example is the demolition of Al-Sharaf Neighbourhood in the Old City of Jerusalem and the transfer of its population to Shuafat Refugee Camp. Besides a full apartheid policy was practiced against those who continued to live in the city as presented below. Later, this policy became the one that is practiced in area C consisting of two-thirds of the West Bank that is under full Israeli control. For example, the Bedouins who are living in this area are under continuous processes of dispossession, while the settler-colonial project is taking over most of area C as a zoning area for the expansion of the settlement residence areas, factories, high-tech industries (as in Salfit district), and the agricultural production areas. This is besides the Israeli control over the Palestinian water resources that are located in area C.

In 2016, the Israeli Minister of Agriculture, Uri Ariel, called for the full annexation of area C to Israel and deporting its 150,000 Palestinian residents to area A of the West Bank (www.alrai.com, 10th of June 2016). Neftali Bennet, the Minister of Economy, called for the same several times, and prepared a plan for a gradual annexation of the West Bank to Israel, starting with the annexation of Ma'ale Adumim settlement directly after the inauguration of the new American President Donald Trump on 20 January 2017 (Theguardian.com 2017).

I conclude that there is only one Israeli annexation policy. In the case of East Jerusalem, it was made as *de jure*, while made as *de facto* for area C of the West Bank. This policy was combined with the other one aiming to divide the Palestinian (people or land) through the invention of formal differences. For instance the Palestinians in East Jerusalem (different than West Bank and Gaza Palestinians) carry blue Israeli identity cards which does not give them at the same time the rights of the Israelis (See below), but it allows them to travel inside Israel and to use its airport (with a

lot of hardships) to go abroad, in addition to getting national insurance and benefiting from the Israeli health insurance system. These 'gifts' will become perceived as poisoned when we see that they are also combined with separating the East Jerusalem Palestinians from their brother and sister Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza Strip and restricting their freedom to travel to these two Palestinian Territories. Consequently, these differences are narrowing day after day due to the Israeli preparations to annex area C to Israel and to transfer its Palestinian population.

The fragmentation policy is not limited to the Palestinians in East Jerusalem, but is a general policy towards all the Palestinians. The Palestinians inside Israel were given Israeli passports, but they face similar procedures that are practiced against the Palestinians in East Jerusalem and area C of the West Bank. They suffer thus from internal dispossession against the Bedouins of the Negev and the non-recognised villages, with the prevention of 1948 internally displaced persons (around 300,000 today) to go back to their communities. They are also not allowed to return to their pre-1948 villages even when there is a resolution by the Israeli High Court allowing them to return. The case of Iqrit and Kafar Ber'im villages and the High Court Resolution of the 1950s letting them go back to their two villages neighbouring the Israeli borders with Lebanon is an example. Besides dispossession, the Palestinians inside Israel face all kinds of discriminatory policies on all economic, social, and political levels confirmed by Israeli resources such as the equality index of the Israeli NGO Sikkuy (1999–2009), and the publications of Ozacky Lazar (2016).

The fragmentation policy created different situations for the Palestinians. Described by the Palestinian Knesset Member Jamal Zahalkah, it is a complex of 'a system of one Centre called Israel that creates a democratic Jewish state to the Jews, combined with a racial discrimination system against the Palestinians inside Israel; a prison system for Gaza; a full apartheid system in the West Bank; Judaisation system in Jerusalem, and an exclusion system to the Diaspora Palestinians' (Zahalkah 2016). A modification to the Zahalkah statement will be that the Judaisation system is not only for Jerusalem, but it is also the prevailing one when dealing with the Palestinians and their lands inside Israel and in the West Bank. The aim of this fragmentation policy is to divide the Palestinians and to prevent the emergence of one united agenda for all of them. The Palestinian programme is currently split between the agenda of the struggle for equality for the pre-1948 Palestinians, the agenda of independence and statehood for the West Bank, Gaza Strip, and East Jerusalem Palestinians, and the agenda of the Right of Return for the Palestinian refugees. The question will be whether the standard features of the Israeli fragmentation policy, especially dispossession (external and

internal) and the apartheid practiced against all the Palestinian groupings, lead to a united agenda between all the Palestinians. Will Jerusalem also be vital for the development of the Palestinian communities?

Settler-Colonial Citizenship Politics: The Case of Jerusalem

Citizenship is understood as a reciprocal relationship between the human being and the state on the one hand and the society and the homeland on the second hand (Salem, 1997). This is apparently non-existent in Jerusalem under Israeli occupation since 1967.

Citizenship politics presented here are those politics that include a combination of social and territorial engineering methods of exclusion and inclusion to achieve a specific political goal. Such politics cover in the case of East Jerusalem a triangle of three primary processes: De-territorialisation, fragmentation, and isolation. To promote such processes, they are combined with other three assisting processes: de-equalisation, de-democratisation (discussed earlier by Nabulsi 2003: 117), and de-development (discussed previously by Sara Roy regarding the 2016 plans). This article will focus on de-territorialisation and fragmentation and isolation regarding citizenship in East Jerusalem while the other mentioned dimensions are covered intensively by the mentioned studies and others. In Jerusalem, the settler-colonial citizenship politics were conducted differently in two periods: The pre-1948 period, and the post-1967 period. Regarding the first period, the citizenship politics were conducted by the Zionist military factions, leading in 1948 to the dispossession of all West Jerusalem Palestinians. This period was covered earlier by many studies (including by Tamari 2002). Therefore, this period will not be discussed here.

The second period of post-1967 occupation is the one discussed here. While the Zionist factions were the perpetrators of the citizenship politics of dispossession in the pre-1948 period, this task is practiced by the Israeli Government in this second period. Contrary to the one-sided citizenship politics of the Zionist factions focusing on dispossession in the pre-1948 period, the Israeli government policies of post-1967 included several components, furthermore dispossessing part of the Palestinians of East Jerusalem, and on the other hand implementing a policy of 'imposed inclusion without integration' towards those who did not leave (Salem 2006, 5). This policy included the use of the different military, legal, economic, social, and political means to sustain it. Thus, what has existed in East Jerusalem since 1967 is not merely a military occupation as it is being described by the local and international politicians, but rather a coloniser 'missionary state politics' that are directed to the fulfillment of the state mission.

Contrary to the regular state that serves all its citizens, the State of Israel is a kind of state that works for the promotion and the implementation of ideology. Since 'The United Jerusalem is the eternal capital of Israel and the heart of the Jewish people', according to this ideology (Herzliya Conference 2009), as so the state will work for transforming this aim into reality. The implementation of this goal will require as a first component of the Israeli citizenship politics the deterritorialisation of the Palestinians from and in East Jerusalem in several stages.

These stages according to previous research are as follows:

- *Stage One, 1967–1993*: The period of annexing East Jerusalem to Israel on 28th of June 1967, confirmed by an August 1980 Knesset legislation, and sustaining this annexation and adding parts of the West Bank to East Jerusalem, doubling it thus by 12 times from 6 square kilometers as it was before 1967 to 72 square kilometers after the 1967 occupation.
- *Stage Two, 1993–2006*: The separation between Jerusalem and the rest of the 1967 Palestinian Territories by the closure system that started at the end of March 1993, and the creation of a 'new Jerusalem' outside Jerusalem (the colonial settlements of Ma'ale Adumim, Pisgat Zeev and Givat Zeev).
- *Stage Three, 2006–today*: creating Greater Jerusalem by annexing the 'new Jerusalem' to it, in addition to the creation of a 'Jewish Old City' that surrounds the Old City, and sustaining the separation between Jerusalem and the West Bank by the establishment of the Separation Wall (Salem 2010: 9–23).

The upcoming Israeli plans regarding East Jerusalem include the establishment of metropolitan Jerusalem by stretching Jerusalem to the Dead Sea shores and the creation of substantial touristic and economic complexes in the empty areas between East Jerusalem and the Dead Sea (Arafah 2016). This process includes annexing of new territories to Israel and ousting territories from what was considered the 'Jerusalem Governorate' before 1967.

Citizenship-wise, this meant forcing part of the East Jerusalem Palestinians to start living under Israeli law in the areas annexed by Israel, and others to be separated from the former pre-1967 Governorate of Jerusalem and to become subject to another kind of Israeli control managed by the Israeli army. The territories that were ousted from the former Governorate include the villages of Eizarriyah, Abu Dis, Sawahreh Al-Sharqiyyah, Al-Shiekh Saad, Hizma, and Qalandia among others. This inclusion created two different categories of Israeli citizenship politics, while those placed under the Israeli-annexed areas of East Jerusalem are considered 'Jordanian citizens' who live permanently in Israel, those who

were ousted were considered till the establishment of the Palestinian Authority in 1994 as 'Jordanian citizens living in areas administered by Israel', and after 1994 they came to be defined as 'Palestinian residents in areas under dispute' (Salem 1998).

The deterritorialisation of the Palestinians in the framework of the former East Jerusalem Governorate took thus three ways, the first by a direct expulsion of part of the population during the 1967 war, and by different methods of ethnic cleansing to be explicated from now on, the second by redefining the territory that was annexed, and the Palestinians living in some of its parts finding themselves deterritorialised from East Jerusalem. The third was that those who were deterritorialised from the former Jerusalem Governorate found themselves re-territorialised in Palestine and in de facto relations with the two Governorates of Ramallah and Bethlehem rather than with Jerusalem. The other face of this deterritorialisation and re-territorialisation of the Palestinians is the re-territorialisation of the Jewish colonial settlers. It should be noted that this process has different dynamics than the dynamics used towards the Palestinians. The colonial settlers are not deterritorialised from their previous residence and life locations, but they are brought to the new territory by incentives, being either ideological or economic. In addition to services through government grants, exemption from taxes and other means of support. The settler-colonial project in East Jerusalem does not restrict itself to the city borders as defined at any moment, but it keeps expanding beyond these boundaries. In other words, the settler project as a mission in the making is the tool used by both the settlers and the Government for creeping annexation of more significant parts of the West Bank to Israel by adding these pieces to the borders of Jerusalem.

Finally, what constitutes the definition of the East Jerusalem Palestinians as Jordanian citizens residing permanently in Israel is multifold:

- First: They are considered Jordanian citizens, not Palestinians, a claim that is based on the Israeli position that the Palestinian citizenship and state never existed, while on the other hand, the area was under the Jordanian ruling system which offered its residents Jordanian citizenship and Jordanian passports.
- Second: As Jordanian citizens, they are aliens who are eligible to get residency rights only. As such they get Israeli travel documents (not passports) issued according to paragraph 2(b) of the law of Passports-1952' as written on its cover page, then in the next page, their nationality is mentioned to be Jordanian.
- Third: They reside in Israel, based on the Israeli ideological claim that Jerusalem is historically Israeli (Jewish), was taken over by different aliens, the latter of which was Jordan. According to this narrative,

Israel liberated it in 1967 and brought it back to its original owners, which are the 'Jewish people as it is claimed'. These claims are already analysed and responded to by many legal and political studies (such as Halabi 1997 and 2001), while the question of this article is how permanent the right of residence in the city is according to Israeli law.

An answer to such a question will suggest that the time range of this permanence kept changing. In the beginning, seven years of staying outside the city were enough to end the permanent residence of a Palestinian in the city, while in Fat'hiyeh Shikaki's case in the 1990s, six years were enough to confiscate her Jerusalem ID. Besides, the Israeli law allows the confiscation of IDs in the case that one is considered to be violating the residency rules, for example withdrawing Mubarak Awad's ID in 1988 because he was calling by then for the boycott of Israeli products. This same procedure was again used by taking away the IDs of Hamas members in the Palestinian Legislative Council in 2006. Therefore, the residency permanency is first not without a time limit, and secondly, it can be withdrawn for violations of Israeli laws. Still, there is a third aspect of this policy which is restricting the granting of residency status to new Palestinians from the West Bank and Gaza who get married to East Jerusalem Palestinians, or to a Palestinian living inside Israel. This policy was intensified in 2002, and the human rights organisations follow its details (see for instance: www.adalah.org).

Thus, the residency rights of citizens of another country (Jordan) as they were considered keeps diminishing. Moreover, this policy is about the 'permanence of the temporary', as the Israeli academic Adi Ophir put it (2006, 25). However, this permanence is not without a time limit as explicated; it might also be a temporary status till a ripe time arrives for conducting a new 'transfer' of the Palestinians of East Jerusalem. In this regard, Adi Ophir also wrote that Palestinian is punished not because he/she committed a mistake, but because he/she exists in a place where Zionism expects him/her not to be (Adi Ophir 2006: 25).

Therefore, the imposed inclusion without integration in Israel is a temporary policy, combined with a stateless situation (residency instead of accepting the Palestinian citizenship of East Jerusalem Palestinians), with discrimination by the Ministry of Interior procedures (see Rwiedi 2000), the national insurance systems (Vitulo 1998), and the municipality services (Margalit 2011 and 2014). Besides these, there is also the discrimination in schools against the use of the Palestinian curricula, and the discrimination against the Palestinian professionals who are obliged to join the Israeli professional associations and to study Hebrew to be able to work. That is in addition to the workers who are required to accede to

the Israeli Histadrut to be able to receive their job rights. The phenomena of inclusion without integration exceeds the examples mentioned above. It stretches to all aspects of the life of the Palestinian in East Jerusalem, including the imposition of Israeli rules over the East Jerusalem health, education, and other institutions versus the deportation of the Palestinian organisations from the city. On the economic level, West Bank and Gaza Strip products have no freedom of access to East Jerusalem, while Israeli products do (for the underdevelopment in East Jerusalem, see UNCTAD reports, mainly from 2016).

The empirical data above indicates that in order to understand the Israeli citizenship politics in East Jerusalem this would need to be analysed within a settler-colonial framework that includes different comparisons. The first comparison is with the pre-1948 Zionist politics. The second comparison relates to settler-colonial politics in East Jerusalem versus the rest of Palestine. Such an analysis is very different to the 'open ethnocracy' analysis suggested by Israeli political geographer Oren Yiftachel (2006). While Yiftachel refers to the territorial issues, he focuses more on the *inclusion* and the *exclusion* processes related to the Greek term '*demos*' — in ancient Greek the term meant 'the people', from which term evolved the modern concept of *democracy*, 'people's power'. Yiftachel claims that the 'Israeli *ethnocracy*' (Jewish 'ethnic power') is an 'open concept' and it includes some aspects of democratic rights accorded to the non-privileged groups in Israeli society. Yiftachel's '*ethnocracy*' approach is closely related to his earlier advocated approach to Israel being an '*ethnic democracy*'. By contrast, however, the settler-colonial approach is no less different from the '*ethnocracy*' approach developed a decade earlier by Norwegian scholar Nils Butenschon (1993). Butenschon, while focusing on the territorial issues of domination, still sees the solution of a rights-based approach around the idea of full *inclusion* in the '*demos*'. Crucially, the settler-colonial approach is both rights-based and territorially-based. Therefore, achieving democratic rights should not be separated from the national right to territory and reclaiming back this territory.

Based on this approach, this section showed the process of deterritorialising the Palestinians in East Jerusalem and out of it (also described as dispossession, displacement and '*nishul*' (Hebrew: 'dispossession') as Israeli human rights activist Jeff Halper suggests). This process was followed by Judaisation of the Palestinian land including the place, the space, the territory and the landscape. Also the Israelisation of the institutions (by expelling the Palestinian organisations outside the city and imposing the Israeli ones instead). These practices were also followed by imposing the affiliation to the Israeli institutions on the Palestinians of East Jerusalem. The latter is combined with the dispersal of the East Jerusalem society and its communities through fragmentation of

the Palestinian neighborhoods in East Jerusalem and marginalising them to become no more than enclaves surrounded and separated by Israeli colonial settlements. The Palestinians living in the pockets have to suffer from isolation and disconnectedness from the other Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza through the closure system and the building of the 'Separation Wall'. Combined with the policies of inclusion without integration, this will leave the Palestinians alienated in their city, politically and socially fragmented on the public level and atomised on the individual level.

Palestinian East Jerusalem Citizens' Responses

The responses to the Israeli settler-colonial citizenship politics varied between reactions of institutions on behalf of the East Jerusalem Palestinians, and responses by the citizens themselves.

Briefly speaking, the period from 1967 to 1987 was a period of institutional responses rather than direct citizens' responses. This does not mean that this period did not include any direct partial citizens' responses. One of the repeatedly mentioned examples of these citizens' responses is the success of the teachers in Jerusalem to prevent, through their strike, the imposition of the Israeli curricula in East Jerusalem schools. Also, there is the success of the keeping the *Waqf* (Islamic and Christian endowments) out of Israeli control in the early years of the occupation, but these were specific struggles that did not lead to a comprehensive Intifada as happened in 1987.

The Canadian researcher Anne Latendresse divided the period of Palestinian resistance from 1967 to 1994 into four stages. The first stage from 1967 to 1974 entailed the Palestinian success in preserving the Palestinian institutions in East Jerusalem: The Islamic *Waqf*, the educational institutions, the chamber of commerce, the Labor and the professional trade unions, Al-Maqasid and Augusta Victoria Hospitals, and the electricity company. The second period is from 1974 to 1987, the period of *sumud* (Arabic: 'steadfastness') included support through the Joint Jordanian-Palestinian Committee. The next stage spans 1987 to 1992, the Intifada that redrew the 1967 borderline between what is Palestine and what is Israel, and the last stage was the stage of negotiations from 1992 to 1994 (Latendresse 1995: 27–55). Latendresse's review shows that the five years from 1987 to 1992 were the only years of citizens' comprehensive struggle. Afterwards, the responses went back to the hands of the elites, this time not represented by the grassroots elites who fought for the preservation of their institutions as was the case from 1967 to 1992 but represented by the high political elite which looked for negotiations as a way out of the settler-colonial occupation.

From 1994 to 2001 (when the national leader and the head of Orient House institution in East Jerusalem Faisal Hussein passed away), the responses were kept in the hand of the Jerusalem institutions, but after 2001, the Israeli authorities closed these institutions in East Jerusalem starting with Orient House itself. That closure was in opposition to Shimon Peres' (by then the Minister of Foreign Affairs) pledge in 1994 to Johan Holst, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Norway to keep the Palestinian institutions open in East Jerusalem. What followed was that the independence of the Palestinian institutions in East Jerusalem went under attack. The Israeli authorities worked to impose the Israeli curricula for education in East Jerusalem, making the Electricity Company dependent on getting energy from the Israeli one and making the hospitals in East Jerusalem reliant to a significant extent on the Israeli health funds. By 2016, what was left out of Israeli control was only the Islamic and the Christian *waqf*, where there are ongoing continuous Israeli attempts to change the status quo and to gain control over them.

Beyond the institutional responses, the citizens' responses stopped in 1992, to be revived in the second Intifada of 2000, but with minor and weak participation from the citizens of East Jerusalem. This low level of involvement may show a sign of protest towards the Palestinian National authority, as a response to the postponement of negotiations regarding the issue of Jerusalem' to the permanent status negotiations, and the failure of these talks in Camp David in 2000. However, this question needs further research.

While not participating intensively in the 2000 Intifada, the Palestinians of East Jerusalem faced restrictions on their freedom to travel to the West Bank in the first years of the Intifada; they were also banned from going to Gaza, an ongoing ban until today. Other restrictions included the erection of the 'Separation Wall' in 2006 around Jerusalem separating Jerusalem partially from the West Bank, followed by the failure of the negotiations held after the Annapolis Conference in 2007, and the war on Gaza at the end of 2008. All those combined with the sustaining of the Israeli institutions in East Jerusalem while the Palestinian ones were shut down led the East Jerusalem Palestinians to respond in four different ways:

- The first is what I called in previous research 'imposed adaptation response' by joining, for instance, the Israeli labor and professional trade unions to receive work rights, or joining the Israeli health funds to receive health services.
- The second response is the voluntary adaptation practiced by a minority who works in Israeli institutions and votes in the Israeli municipality elections.

- The third is a kind of adaptation that aims to avoid the negative side of the Israeli exclusion policies, such as registering an NGO according to Israeli law in order for it to be able to work in the city, paying the penalty with the aim of avoiding house demolition, or registering a residency to a husband or wife from the West Bank to prevent deporting him/her from the city.
- The fourth and the last response is what I call: 'adaptation through rejection' (Salem 2006: 8). This type of response takes two shapes. One is by confrontation with the settler-colonial system as happened for instance in 2014 after the burning of the Palestinian child Mohammad Abu-Khdeir. Abu Khdeir was kidnapped by an extreme Jewish right-wing group from the street in his village of Shufat in Jerusalem. The other example of confrontation is the 2015 stabbing events of Israeli soldiers and policemen by young Palestinians in Jerusalem. The second response is the silent rejection, by building houses without a permit in a bigger number than the Israeli authorities can demolish, keeping thus an address in East Jerusalem or returning to it to avoid confiscation of their IDs, or living 'illegally' in Jerusalem according to Israeli laws (Salem 2006: 8).

These responses have two characteristics; they are citizen-based and community-based. They involve people with human security rights, which means the right of all people to equal access to the freedom from fear and the freedom of want. This is one side of the coin, the other side is that the responses are still scattered, local, spontaneous, not continuous, not part of a comprehensive and cohesive plan, and not capable of stopping and changing the course of the settler-colonial project in the city. They are responses that aim to keep survival within the framework of severe hardships, no less and no more.

Conclusion

Within what theoretical framework can the Palestinian case including East Jerusalem and its citizenship be explicated?

Towards a typology: five analytical frameworks might be identified; these are the frameworks of equality/inequality, occupation, colonialism combined with neo-colonialism, ethnocracy, apartheid, and settler-colonialism. The first framework of inequality/equality is one that is open to two options. The first will seek to improve the level of equality in services within the current structure of power relations that exist in the city. This approach is conducted by part of the Israeli human rights organisations acting in the city against the discrimination of services towards East Jerusalem, in comparison to those services delivered to

West Jerusalem. The problem of such an approach is that it ignores the political rights of the Palestinians, and therefore it adds to the sustaining of the current power relations in the city. Further to that, this approach is incapable of confronting the dynamic processes of escalating the de-deteritorialisation of Palestinians in the city. The other approach within this framework is the one that seeks to achieve equality through a full transformation of the current power structure, and the creation alternatively of one bi-national state, or a state for all its citizens. This approach includes a future project that deserves another article to discuss it.

Regarding the description of the situation in East Jerusalem as being under a military belligerent occupation, it should be noted that this is only a partial description. The Israeli army and the security forces are acting on behalf of the ongoing settler-colonial project in the city. The combination of colonialism (occupation) with the neo-colonialism is also not enough to describe the situation in Jerusalem. On the one hand, there is a military occupation in the city. On the other hand, there are neo-colonial aspects of domination going on such as monopolising the East Jerusalem market for the Israeli products and preventing the Palestinian products from having their freedom of access to the city. Besides these two components, there is also a third one which is the settler-colonial element aiming to Judaise and Israelise the city. The ethnocracy framework focuses as discussed on the inclusions and the exclusions from the 'demos' while giving less weight to the territorial issues and the people rights to them. Apartheid is the result of such an analysis while ignoring partially or entirely the other process of ethnic cleansing and spacio-cide.

The settler-colonial framework is the one that is capable of overcoming the shortcomings of the four typologies mentioned. It can explicate the combination of military occupation with neo-colonialism and settler-colonialism. The occupation tools are used as tools to sustain settler colonialism, while the neo-colonial instruments, apartheid policies and the improvement of minor and partial civil rights, are all used as temporary procedures till the right moment comes for the launching of a new transfer against the indigenous population, or most of them. Being such a process rather than an event, the settler-colonial project is currently escalating its steps towards a new collective transfer for the Palestinians as a repetition of the two transfers of 1948 and 1967. The growing internal displacements in area C and East Jerusalem and the booming voices towards annexation of area C to Israel and evacuating its inhabitants also are just signals for the preparation of such upcoming transfer to be executed while the Arab and international policies continue to be incapable of changing the path. The tools of settler-colonialism presented by this article will be those that will be used in that direction.

Finally, the responses of the Palestinians to the settler-colonial project were mostly either top-down responses (through armed-struggle or negotiations), or bottom-up political activities taking the shape of demonstrations, sit-ins and others, while what was missing is a bottom-up community-based process that creates and sustains Palestinian facts on the ground on the path of providing people with human security components of freedom from fear and freedom from want. Such a process might be worth exploring to give people the tools for steadfastness in the face of a potential upcoming 'transfer'.

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